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ABSTRACT
“Racial mirroring” refers to efforts by one group to match the primary racial composition of another
group. In contrast to racial balancing, which takes place when two groups are adjusted
simultaneously to achieve a desired degree of racial equilibrium between them, racial mirroring
occurs when the racial makeup of one group is adjusted so as to reflect the predominant racial
identity of the second group.
Employers and even federal courts engage in racial mirroring. For example, in order to generate
trust among customers, employers have hired or promoted individuals of the same race as the
employers’ primary customer base. Further, in order to ensure that attorneys can fairly and
adequately represent the interests of their clients, a federal district court judge required counsel in
class action cases to staff attorneys that reflect the racial diversity of the clients. Federal appellate
courts have approved these twin forms of racial mirroring.
This Article challenges employer and judicial attempts to match the racial identity of one group to
the primary racial identity of another. It argues that these practices, however intuitive and wellintentioned, violate the Equal Protection Clause, embody harmful racial stereotypes, and generate
significant social costs.
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INTRODUCTION
The deaths of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, in
Ferguson, Missouri, and of Eric Garner, an unarmed black man, in
Staten Island, New York, both at the hands of white police officers,
have catalyzed racial tensions across the country. Recommendations
for how those tensions may be eased, and for how a more harmonious multiracial nation may emerge, soon followed.
One suggestion concerns the racial composition of predominantly
white police departments in predominantly African-American neigh1
borhoods. Ferguson has 21,000 residents, 67% of whom are black.
Ferguson’s police force has fifty-three officers, only four of whom, or
7%, are black. 2 Seizing on these figures, some have proposed that the
Ferguson police department, and similar police departments in other
1

2

See Rebecca Leber, Ferguson’s Police Force Is 94 Percent White—And That’s Basically Normal in
the U.S., THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
119070/michael-browns-death-leads-scrutiny-ferguson-white-police.
News outlets reported that African Americans only made up 5.6% of the Ferguson police
force, which is three officers out of the fifty-three on the force. See, e.g., id. With focus on
the racial composition of the Ferguson police department, other news outlets clarified
that there are four black officers on the fifty-three-member force. See, e.g., Steve
Contorno et al., PunditFact Fact-Checks The Aug. 17 News Shows, POLITIFACT (Aug. 17, 2014,
5:41 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2014/aug/17/punditfactfact-checks-aug-17-news-shows/.
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cities, should reflect the racial demographics of their served communities. Former NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, for example, encouraged this mutuality of racial identity, claiming that it makes for “easier” and “smarter” policing. 3
This argument may be restated in general terms: Trust is the
touchstone of effective policing. 4 In communities of color, that trust
has been undermined by the painful legacy and stubborn persistence
of actual or perceived racial discrimination in law enforcement. Accordingly, communities of color confronted by a predominantly nonblack police force may assume that the police force is biased and that
such bias will work its way into adverse law enforcement decisions.
This view erodes confidence in the police which, in turn, makes
communities of color less inclined to communicate with and support
law enforcement.
By contrast, communities of color may be more receptive to a police force that looks like them and that does not embody actual or
perceived bias. A shared racial makeup thereby may help foster trust
which, in turn, may facilitate cooperation between law enforcement
and people of color. In other words, a mutuality of racial identity
may yield better policing outcomes, the argument goes.
From this overview, it seems tough to argue with the proposed
matching of the racial identity of the police force with the predominant racial makeup of the town or city, or with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that “[t]he composition
and operation of an effective police force should be in as complete
5
harmony as possible with the community from which it springs.” It
seems similarly difficult to contest the “external legitimacy” doctrine,
the general principle behind the specific police department suggestion. Under this doctrine, employers may give special consideration
to job applicants of the same race as the clients that the employer
serves because employees of the same race will be able to generate

3

4

5

This Week with George Stephanopoulos: Aftermath of the Darren Wilson Grand Jury Decision (ABC
News television broadcast Nov. 30, 2014), available at http://abc.go.com/shows/thisweek-with-george-stephanopoulos/listing/2014-11/30-this-week-1130-aftermath-of-thedarren-wilson-grand-jury-decision.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY
POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, at vii (1994), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/commp.pdf (“A foundation of trust will allow police to form close relationships
with the community that will produce solid achievements. Without trust between police
and citizens, effective policing is impossible.”)
Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074
(2004) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. City of Chicago, 663
F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1981)).
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trust and cooperation among the clients and thus boost the “external
6
legitimacy” of the employer.
Attempts to ensure that individuals in one defined group reflect
the racial composition of another group may be termed “racial mir7
roring.” Suggestions that police departments echo the racial diversity of the city or town is an example of this practice. Despite the intuitive promise of racial mirroring, including in the police context, I am
8
afraid that racial mirroring violates the Equal Protection Clause,
perpetuates harmful racial stereotypes, and therefore produces significant legal and social costs. The purpose of this Article is to explain
this constitutional and extra-legal—and admittedly unwelcome—
conclusion.
Racial mirroring produces three sets of distinction costs: (1)
those affecting the individuals seeking particular opportunities (individual costs), (2) those affecting all others (social costs), and (3)
those affecting the courts (judicial costs).
First, racial mirroring imposes costs on individuals who are candidates for particular opportunities. With respect to the individual who
is given the position for “external legitimacy” reasons, racial mirroring enables decisionmakers to categorically presume that the candidate, solely because of his or her racial identity, has the qualities
6

7

8

See, e.g., Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114–15 (discussing how minority representation in the police
force is critical for its effective operation because the minority population will exhibit
greater trust and confidence in the police force). The term “external legitimacy” in this
context may be attributed to Professor Cynthia Estlund’s important article in this area.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in
the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2005) (referring to the “external legitimacy” argument, or the “business case for diversity,” which “points to the increasingly diverse nature of firms’ external constituencies—its clientele and contractors—and the
credibility, legitimacy, and cultural knowledge that a diverse workforce brings to the project of capturing and cultivating those external constituencies”).
“Racial mirroring” is distinct from “racial balancing.” In “racial balancing,” the racial
composition of two groups is adjusted with the purpose of achieving an acceptable range
of racial diversity within the two groups. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–12, 720–22 (2007) (striking down the school districts’ policy which made transfer decisions between schools on the basis of race—in order to ensure that no school was racially isolated (i.e., having insufficient numbers of students
from racial minority groups) or racially concentrated (i.e., having insufficient numbers of
non-minority students)—because it was not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest). The Court has held that when the racial mixing is done “for its own sake,” it is discrimination. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.). In contrast, “racial mirroring” occurs when the racial composition of only one side is adjusted to reflect the racial composition of some other, ostensibly
static group. Further, the purpose is usually to derive some benefit from the racial identities being in lockstep.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
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tending to produce “external legitimacy” among clients of the same
race, without regard to the actual characteristics of the candidate.
This problem is one of using and perpetuating racial stereotypes as to
the existence of some desired quality (the “positive presumption”
problem).
Racial mirroring also expects this candidate, once hired or otherwise retained, to “perform” or exhibit the traits and behaviors—
presumed to exist on account of his or her race—that may foster trust
and cooperation. This is a problem of demanding performance
based on race (the “performance” problem).
With respect to the candidate who is denied the opportunity, racial mirroring enables decisionmakers to presume that only individuals of the shared race can produce external trust, and thereby presumes as a corollary that individuals of other races lack the desired
ability to generate external trust and cooperation. This is a problem
of using and perpetuating racial stereotypes as to the non-existence
of some desired quality (the “negative presumption” problem).
In addition, the operation of these presumptions is the functional
exclusion of the second candidate from equal consideration. This is
a problem of denying equal opportunity on the basis of race (the
“equal consideration” problem).
With respect to both candidates, in invoking a categorical or automatic presumption, the decisionmaker not only drives whether an
individual’s race is taken into account but also determines the substantive meaning of the individual’s race in that decision-making process. The decisionmaker imposes meaning on the racial identities of
both candidates. This is a problem of defining for the individual
whether, and how, his or her race matters (the “race defining” problem).
Second, the “external legitimacy” doctrine imposes costs on others. Racial mirroring precludes decisionmakers, the decisionmakers’
clients, and the broader public from understanding and appreciating
that an individual of any race may possess the qualities and attributes
that may produce trust and cooperation, even if the individual is of a
race that differs from the predominant race of the served community.
This problem is one of actively feeding and fostering, rather than
dismantling and breaking down, racial stereotypes (the “stereotype
entrenchment” problem).
Racial mirroring also eases the pathway for individuals of the desired race to possess an opportunity, as if the role is the presumptive
or exclusive province of individuals of the desired race, and also
stands as a barrier to entry for individuals of other racial identities
who aspire to have the same opportunity. This is a problem of de-
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termining whether social roles are reserved for members of a given
race (the “role exclusion” problem).
Third, with respect to the courts, racial mirroring uses the judicial
system as an instrument to validate the racial presumptions relied
upon by the decisionmaker. This problem is one of utilizing the
courts as a conduit for privately held racial stereotypes (the “judicial
validation” problem).
These points indicate, individually and in combination, that there
are cognizable harms to mirroring the racial identity of the individuals with that of the served constituency, and these harms extend to
the desired racial group, the undesired racial group, society at large,
and the courts. It confirms the Supreme Court’s prophetic warning
9
to be wary of simple fixes to issues of race. As these harms are of a
constitutional order, they necessarily outweigh any social interest in
or exigent desire for racial mirroring.
This Article proceeds in the following steps:
Part I provides an overview of the “external legitimacy” doctrine
and summarizes judicial and scholarly opinion finding that the doctrine is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
Part II details the three categories of harms previously mentioned
and suggests that the “external legitimacy” doctrine cannot be sustained, in an equal protection challenge, because of those harms.
Part III then applies this analysis of the “external legitimacy” doctrine to the police department suggestion made by former Commissioner Kelly and others, finding that there are serious constitutional
problems with the suggestion. This Part also identifies two limitations
on the reach of objections to racial mirroring. While the problems
with racial mirroring apply in principle to both the tribal employment and affirmative action contexts, neither context may be challenged with reference to these problems. For tribal employment, this
is because special statutory protections shield employers on or near
tribal lands from the ordinary operation of pertinent antidiscrimination principles. For affirmative action, this is because permissible race-conscious admissions is not premised upon an interest
in ensuring that the racial diversity of a student body reflects the racial diversity of the local or general population, which would constitute racial mirroring, but is instead allowed on another basis, namely
producing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.

9

See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) (“Only those lacking responsible
humility will have a confident solution for problems as intractable as the frictions attributable to differences of race.”).
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Part IV answers the question of what next. It suggests that race
may not be considered pursuant to categorical presumptions. Instead, employers and others should probe whether the individual
possesses the desired traits in actuality; this inquiry should be based
on the individual’s demonstrable record and not inferred from his or
her race.
While the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of
10
racial balancing, it has never squarely confronted the constitutionality of racial mirroring. It is hoped that this Article may be useful to
the bench and the bar in considering challenges to the practice of
racial mirroring. In light of calls for racial mirroring in the policing
context, the moment seems ripe for such guidance.
I. “EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY”
The Equal Protection Clause generally guarantees that similarly
11
situated individuals be treated equally by public institutions. That
said, a public institution may be allowed to treat similarly situated individuals differently provided that there is a sufficient justification for
the different treatment and the means used bears a sufficiently close
12
relationship to that justification. If the different treatment is premised upon race, the justification must be “compelling” and the means
13
must be “narrowly tailored” to the compelling purpose. This form
of review—strict scrutiny—is to be searching and exacting—fatal in
14
form, but not in fact.

10

11

12

13

14

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[R]acial balancing . . . is patently unconstitutional.”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“If petitioner’s purpose is
to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as
insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution
forbids.”).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”).
See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (“When those who appear
similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to
legislation or regulation are indeed being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions.’” (citations omitted)).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest.” (citations omitted)).
See id. at 237 (“[The court] wish[es] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.’” (citations omitted)).
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Public employers have claimed, under this equal protection rubric, that promoting the employer’s credibility among the local
community is a compelling reason to use race in employment decisions. In particular, these employers have argued that buy-in from
the local community is necessary to the effective operation of the
employer’s services, and as a result the employers should be able to
give special consideration in hiring or promotion to an employee of
15
the same, predominant race of the local community members. This
Part provides an overview of judicial and academic support for this
argument, and of their specific determinations that the “external legitimacy” doctrine is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
A. Judicial Support for “External Legitimacy”
Perhaps one of the more significant examples of “external legiti16
macy’s” use and approval is Petit v. City of Chicago. In this case, the
Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) sought to promote racial minor17
ities to the rank of sergeant. A number of non-minority officers who
were denied the promotion filed suit under the Equal Protection
18
The CPD defended its actions on the grounds that the
Clause.
promotions “were necessary to maintain the operational effectiveness
19
20
of the CPD.” The district court agreed, and the U.S. Court of Ap15

16

17
18

19
20

In this respect, the “external legitimacy” doctrine is not “racial balancing,” which occurs
when the racial composition of a body is done to reflect a static group “for its own sake.”
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). The “external legitimacy” doctrine falls
under the banner of “racial mirroring” because the reflection is accomplished ostensibly
to achieve trust and cooperation among the served constituents. This suggests that “racial mirroring” can be a form of racial capitalism. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126
HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2152 (2013) (defining racial capitalism as “the process of deriving social and economic value from the racial identity of another person”).
352 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004). I highlight this
case in part because it not only embodies the “external legitimacy” principle, but also because it has been singled out by others for its importance. See, e.g., Jared M. Mellott,
Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter: The Case for
Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1129 (2006) (“Petit’s reference to Grutter signified a more expansive understanding of the diversity rationale in employment than the
earlier Seventh Circuit cases had embraced.”); Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 221 (2004) (“Petit is an important example of the way in which Grutter can be extended beyond the educational
context and into the public sector workplace.”).
Petit, 352 F.3d at 1112.
Id. (“[N]onminority Chicago police officers . . . alleged that the affirmative action plan
implemented in connection with that examination deprived them of the equal protection
of the law.”).
Id.
Petit v. City of Chicago, 239 F. Supp. 2d 761, 788 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Consistent with the
instructions given at the trial, the Seventh Circuit subsequently held that a police de-
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peals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there is a “compelling need for diversity in a large metropolitan police force charged
with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major American city
like Chicago” and that the “City of Chicago has set out a compelling
21
operational need for a diverse police department.” The Seventh
Circuit, favorably recounting the testimony of a criminal justice and
community policing expert, noted that
[t]he reality of urban policing is that minorities are frequently mistrustful
of police and are more willing than nonminorities to believe that the police engage in misconduct . . . . [N]onminorities have more favorable
opinions about the CPD than do minorities. Distrust and a lack of confidence in the police, in turn, reduce the willingness of some community
members to cooperate with the police. On the other hand, when police
officers are routinely supervised by minorities, the fears that the police
22
department is hostile to the minority community will naturally abate.

The Seventh Circuit also cited approvingly to “high-ranking CPD
officials,” who
confirmed the need for diversity at the sergeant rank and [asserted] that
sergeants are in a unique position to influence officers on the street.
These officals testified that the presence of minority sergeants has not
only improved police-community cooperation, but also defused potentially explosive situations, such as the tense racial situation following riots
in the 1980’s in a predominately Hispanic community . . . [and] recounted the growth in the minority population of the City and the fact that
minority representation at the sergeant rank had not kept pace with that
23
growth.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit referred to two of its prior decisions
for the proposition that “a visible presence of minorities in supervisory positions is critical to effective policing in a racially diverse city like
24
Chicago because supervisors set the tone for the department.” In
one of those cases, the circuit court stated that “[e]ffective police
work, including the detection and apprehension of criminals, requires that the police have the trust of the community and they are
more likely to have it if they have ‘ambassadors’ to the community of
25
the same [race or] ethnicity.” In the second, the Seventh Circuit
noted that “[t]he composition and operation of an effective police
force should be in as complete harmony as possible with the commu-

21
22
23
24
25

partment’s operational need for diversity in its workforce can be a compelling interest for
engaging in affirmative action promotions.” (citations omitted)).
Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
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nity from which it springs.” 26 The Seventh Circuit therefore concluded that the “CPD had a compelling interest in a diverse population at
the rank of sergeant in order to set the proper tone in the department and to earn the trust of the community, which in turn increases
27
police effectiveness in protecting the city.” For the narrowly tailored
prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, the court focused on the fact that
the CPD “standardized the scores based on race” after noticing that
the promotion test scores would have resulted in modest promotions
28
for minority officers. The Seventh Circuit held that adjustment was
a permissible means to effectuate its compelling interest in a racially
29
diverse sergeant corps.
Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit has sanctioned employers’ use of
30
For example, the circuit
race on “external legitimacy” grounds.
court ruled that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a correctional
facility in search of lieutenants for a “boot camp” aimed at younger
inmates could prefer African Americans where the inmates were
31
overwhelmingly African American. Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the court, credited defense experts who claimed that the
“boot camp . . . would not succeed in its mission of pacification and
reformation with as white a staff as it would have had if a black male
32
had not been appointed to one of the lieutenant slots.”
Other courts of appeals have joined the Seventh Circuit in endorsing race-based considerations for external legitimacy/internal opera33
tions reasons in the law enforcement context. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for instance, ruled that a city police
26
27
28
29
30

31
32
33

Petit, 352 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. City of Chicago,
663 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
Id.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1117–18.
It is worth emphasizing that, in these cases, the government’s rationale for using race is
not tied to any past, intentional discrimination that it is now attempting to remedy. For
one such case, see, e.g., McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1998)
(approving the remedial use of race upon evidence of the “City’s discrimination against
blacks and Hispanics in the past . . . .). Rather, the government’s argument is founded
on the forward-looking belief that the employee of the same race as the clients will improve the relationship between the employer-clients, and will thereby enhance the ability
of the employer to do its job. For example, in Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, the Seventh
Circuit specified that the interests of the police department were to “creat[e] a truly representative force and better prepar[e] all officers for culturally-diverse interaction in the
community they serve.” 474 F.3d 437, 445 n.10 (7th Cir. 2007).
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917–19 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 920.
At least one circuit stated specifically that it is not expressing any opinion as to whether it
agrees with Petit. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d
949, 964 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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department could give preference to an African-American applicant
for major, as the appointment of an African American to this “policymaking position would benefit a city whose population was approxi34
mately 50% black.” In reaching this decision, the Fourth Circuit
quoted approvingly from a Sixth Circuit opinion in a similar case involving the “operational needs of an urban police department serving
35
a multi-racial [sic] population” :
The argument that police need more minority officers is not simply that
blacks communicate better with blacks or that a police department
should cater to the public’s desires. Rather, it is that effective crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in the police.
In short, the focus is not on the superior performance of minority officers, but on the public’s perception of law enforcement officials and insti36
tutions.

In an oft-cited case in this area of law, the Second Circuit struck a
similar chord. The court “recognized that a law enforcement body’s
need to carry out its mission effectively, with a workforce that appears
unbiased, is able to communicate with the public and is respected by
the community it serves, may constitute a compelling state interest” in
37
satisfaction of the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, the Second
Circuit has insisted that “[t]he mere assertion of an ‘operational
need’ to make race-conscious employment decisions does not . . . give
a police department carte blanche to dole out work assignments based
on race if no such justification is established.” 38 Rather, the need
must be factually supported and the decisions themselves must be
narrowly tailored to the need. 39 Moreover, in another case concern34
35
36
37

38
39

Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id.
Id. (quoting Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979)).
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 52 (2nd Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238
(2nd Cir. 1988)). But also Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 300 (5th Cir.
1968) (holding that “a Department’s practice of assigning Negroes solely on the basis of
race to a Negro enclave” offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Murray v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 06–C–1372, 2011 WL 382694, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 31, 2011) (holding that while “it is proper to consider the race of applicants, the racial makeup of the community, and diversity when selecting police personnel . . . in certain circumstances,” the state, in this case, had “not made any showing of a compelling interest, nor ha[d] they established that the existence of a compelling interest is an
undisputed fact”).
Patrolmen’s, 310 F.3d at 52.
See id. at 53 (“The justification must be substantiated by objective evidence—mere speculation or conjecture is insufficient . . . . Further, the race-based measure must be narrowly
tailored to serve the identified interest.”). The court ultimately agreed with the jury that
the race-based assignments were not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state inter-
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ing the promotion of African-American police officers, the First Circuit stated that it was “sympathetic to the argument that communities
place more trust in a diverse police force and that the resulting trust
40
reduces crime rates and improves policing.”
The Third Circuit in Lomack v. City of Newark did not, however, ex41
tend the “external legitimacy” doctrine to fire departments. The
Third Circuit pointed out that there was no evidence that “diversity
within individual fire companies is in any other way necessary, or
even beneficial, to the Fire Department’s mission of fighting fires, i.e.,
that the Department has an operational need for diverse fire compa42
nies . . . .” Similarly, the Second Circuit invalidated an assignment
by a civil service commission, where the assignment was “based on a
racial stereotype that blacks work better with blacks,” “on the premise
that [the plaintiff’s] race was directly related to his ability to do the
job,” and on the belief that “his race . . . specially qualif[ied] him for
43
Insofar as the courts are concerned, these two cases
the work.”
speak to the limits of the “external legitimacy” doctrine outside of the
police and prison contexts.
That said, one judge has not only validated, but mandated, racial
mirroring even outside of these two contexts. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 requires federal district court judges to “appoint class
counsel” and authorizes said judges to consider, in appointing class
counsel, “any . . . matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and
44
adequately represent the interests of the class.” Pursuant to this
rule, U.S. District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., issued an order stating that
“[i]n consideration of other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to
fairly and adequately represent the class, [class counsel] should ensure that the lawyers staffed on the case fairly reflect the class composition in terms of relevant race . . . metrics.” 45 The Second Circuit af-

40
41
42

43
44
45

est in operational need, particularly as there was no evidence supporting the operational
need here. Id. at 52–54.
Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 172 n.10 (1st Cir. 2003).
463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id.; see also Dietz v. Baker, 523 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (D. Del. 2007) (ruling that summary
judgment was inappropriate where a question of fact existed as to whether race could be
justified for operational needs purposes).
Knight v. Nassau Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2nd Cir. 1981).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09–CV–10035, 2011 WL 1194707, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2011). The class certification order extended to “race and gender metrics,” id.,
though the legality or propriety of ensuring that employees reflect the gender of clients is
beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted that Judge Baer has issued similar
orders in previous cases. See Martin v. Blessing, 134 S. Ct. 402, 403 (2013) (citing Public
Employees’ Retirement Sys. of Miss. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 09 CV 1110, 280
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firmed the order 46 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 47 Justice
Samuel A. Alito issued a statement on the denial of certiorari in a
48
class action suit. Justice Alito found it necessary to clarify that while
the Court denied certiorari, “the meaning of the Court’s denial of
49
the petition should not be misunderstood.” He signaled to Judge
Baer—and all other federal judges—that the class certification order
was both unjustifiable and impractical. Unjustifiable, as Justice Alito
stated that he was “hard-pressed to see any ground on which Judge
Baer’s practice can be defended” 50 and he found it “quite farfetched
to argue that class counsel cannot fairly and adequately represent a
class unless the race. . . of counsel mirror[s] the demographics of the
51
class.” Impractical, as Justice Alito suggested that the order, if enforced, would “complicate” the appointment process and produce
52
“bizarre results.” Ultimately, Justice Alito cautioned that, if the order was not sufficiently addressed on remand, “future review may be
53
warranted.”
Racial mirroring in class certification may be seen as anomalous.
Federal courts have routinely endorsed racial mirroring in the policing and prison contexts. Scholars, as with Judge Baer, are not as constrained in their assessment as to the desirable scope of racial mirroring.
B. Academic Support for “External Legitimacy”
The logic of the “external legitimacy” doctrine reaches any position where external trust or cooperation is important to the internal

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

F.R.D. 130, 142 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2012); N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Residential
Capital, LLC, Nos. 08 CV 8781, 08 CV 5093, 2012 WL 4865174, at *5, n.5 (S.D.N.Y., Oct.
15, 2012); In re Gildan Activewear Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 5048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2010)).
Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 1, (2d Cir. 2012). The panel held that
the appellants lacked standing to challenge the order. Id. at 6.
Martin, 134 S. Ct. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Martin, 134 S. Ct. at 403–04.
Id. at 405. Prior to Justice Alito’s involvement, other scholars had been critical of Judge
Baer’s attempts to ensure that class counsel reflect the racial diversity of the clients. See,
e.g., Michael H. Hurwitz, Judge Harold Baer’s Quixotic Crusade for Class Counsel Diversity, 17
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 321, 327–29 (2011) (describing problems with Judge Baer’s
“class counsel diversity requirement”).
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operation of the employer. 54 Indeed, some scholars are of the opin55
ion that Petit should permeate other areas of employment. Ivan E.
Bodensteiner suggests, for example, that Petit ostensibly could be extended to all municipal services: “credibility and trust are important
to the successful operation of a municipality, [and] expert testimony
may establish a compelling need for diversity in departments of a
56
David Orentlicher
municipality that provide municipal services.”
likewise contends that “diversity in the workplace would be beneficial
in other public agencies whose employees have frequent interaction
57
with a diverse public.”
Perhaps the strongest appeal for the use of race by an employer
for “external legitimacy” purposes outside of the police and penal
58
contexts has been put forward by Shani M. King. In particular, Professor King argues that “legal services organizations that serve large
populations of African-American clients should employ staff attorneys
who are most likely to engender trust and facilitate communication
with their clients. Consequently, these organizations should employ
59
African-American staff attorneys.” Professor King posits, “If [legal
services] organizations reflect the racial and ethnic make-up of the

54

55

56
57
58
59

See Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 833, 847–48 (2011) (“There is no reason to believe African American or Latino firefighters perform their jobs differently from white firefighters, and there is no particular
reason to believe that the community might be concerned with the race of firefighters.
Unlike a police department, where community cooperation and language skills can be
central to effective operations, no one is likely to turn away a fire truck because of the
race of the firefighters, and other than in fire investigations, there is not a strong need for
community cooperation.”); Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading
Cases III: Federal Statutes and Regulations—Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 123 HARV. L. REV. 282,
292 (2009) (“[T]he racial composition of a fire department is largely irrelevant to its ability to protect the public from fire.”).
See Angela Brouse, The Last Call for Diversity in Law Firms: Is it Legal?, 75 UMKC L. Rev.
847, 847–48 (2007) (private law firms); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1076 n.67 (2006)
(military and business organizations); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity,
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 98–99 (1997) (state
trial court judges); Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 25, 39 (2005) (law enforcement, the judiciary, the media, and
education).
Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Although Risky After Ricci and Parents Involved, Benign Race-Conscious
Action is Often Necessary, 22 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 28 (2009).
David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 MO. L. REV. 777, 804,
805 n.145 (2005).
See Shani M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services Organizations Need African-American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2008).
Id. at 3–4; see also id. at 54–55 (“[L]egal services organizations that represent large populations of black Americans should be race conscious and hire more black lawyers”).
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populations that they serve, African-American clients are more likely
60
to consider these organizations credible and legitimate.”
From this overview, it is clear that the “external legitimacy” rationale for race-conscious hiring—the notion that an individual of
the same race as the clients or customer base will enhance the credibility of the employer and allow the employer to be more effective—
has been embraced by courts and scholars alike, with the latter generally advancing a more expansive view of the doctrine than the for61
mer.
II. PROBLEMS WITH “EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY”
In this Part, I will introduce the reader to three categories of
62
harms that counsel against the use of the “external legitimacy.”
A running hypothetical may be helpful in conceptualizing these
problems. The courts have found the “external legitimacy” doctrine
constitutional in the law enforcement and prison contexts, and
scholars have argued for the constitutionality of the doctrine’s use in
other areas in which trust and cooperation from the served community are deemed essential. The hypothetical uses another field in
which that relationship is important to the effectiveness of the service
provider’s functions.
Let us assume that an urban elementary school in a predominantly African-American neighborhood has an opening for a second63
grade teacher. The school has two qualified applicants—an African
60

61

62
63

Id. at 38; see also id. at 40 (“[Legal services] organizations should hire African-American
attorneys in order to establish the external legitimacy which is necessary if they are to
gain their clients’ trust.”).
Public commentators have argued in favor of “external legitimacy” outside of the domestic employment context. For example, in the foreign policy space, some have suggested
that the United States must counter violent extremism by giving support to locals “who
can credibly deflate extremists’ messages . . . .” Manal Omar, The United States Will Never
Win the Propaganda War Against the Islamic State, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan. 9, 2015, available at
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/09/the-united-states-will-never-win-the-propagandawar-against-the-islamic-state/.
The only exception is in tribal employment, as tribes are protected by special considerations owing to their unique status. See infra Part IV.B.
This hypothetical is selected for four reasons. First, it is the type of non-commercial,
community-based employers that advocates of the external legitimacy doctrine suggest
have the greatest claim to this theory. See Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the
Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 267 (2003–2004). Second, it is similar to the legal services organization example used by Professor King, though deliberately
different in order for the reader to view and appraise the application of the external legitimacy argument in another non-commercial, community-based context. Third, it attempts to depart from the traditional frame of white (the “insider” racial group) and minorities (the “outsider” racial group), where this white/minority paradigm itself tends to
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American and an Asian American—where the threshold requirements to be “qualified” are a college degree and a valid, active teaching certificate. The school principal and the rest of the school’s hiring committee express interest in hiring the African-American
candidate, resting this interest on the “external legitimacy” argument.
In particular, as to the current state of affairs, the school officials perceive that cooperation between the parents and the school has been
modest. But the officials believe that the African-American candidate
will increase buy-in from parents and this buy-in will yield enhanced
educational outcomes in two respects: first, focusing on the school
itself, the officials have a strong sense that will enhance the possibility
that predominantly African-American parents will trust the educational choices of teachers, will become more involved in school governance and policy development, and will enrich the educational and
extra-curricular activities of the school, for example, through volunteering to coach sports teams or advise student clubs; second, focusing outside of school, the school officials assume that engaged parents will implement the teacher’s suggestions as to how they can best
support the student at home, will be invested in creating optimal educational conditions for the student, and will actively assist the stu64
dents with their daily assignments. The school officials contend that
the buy-in, facilitated by the African-American candidate, will enable
65
the school to do its job more effectively. Accordingly, the African66
American candidate is hired.

64

65

66

predetermine the merits of the doctrine. Fourth, and practically speaking, this hypothetical is based on the actual experiences of a good friend and former colleague who is a
grade school teacher, thanks to Teach for America, in a major metropolitan majorityminority city.
The school officials’ assumptions are not uncommon. At least historically, school districts
believed that “minority teachers were better teachers for minority students.” Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008). Further, African-American
teachers preferred to teach African-American students. See id.
Even if there is the possibility of improved educational outcomes for students and diminished expectations by teachers, state action must still remain within the bounds of the
Constitution. For a discussion of the constitutional costs of racial matching, see. Thomas
S. Dee, The Race Connection: Are Teachers More Effective with Students Who Share Their Ethnicity?, EDUC. NEXT, 53 (2004) (“Black students learn more from black teachers and white
students from white teachers, suggesting that the racial dynamics within classrooms may
contribute to the persistent racial gap in student performance. . . .”); Thomas S. Dee, A
Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 158, 159 (2005)
(determining that teachers of different races than the students tend to have lower expectations of those students).
The potential for this racial matching is not merely hypothetical. See Alan M. Lerner, Law
& Lawyering in the Work Place: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical
Judgment as Creative Problem Solver, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107, 107–08 (1999) (describing a sit-
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This scenario runs afoul of the following principles that stem from
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.
A. Individual Costs
1. The Positive Presumption Problem
The school officials are presuming, solely on the basis of race, that
the African-American candidate will generate trust and cooperation
from African-American parents. The presumption does not rest on
the actual qualities of the candidate, for example his or her social
skills, his or her ability to work with parents, or a demonstrated commitment to students or minorities. Instead, the race of the applicant
67
is used as a proxy for these qualities.
The employer’s action is inconsistent with prevailing Supreme
Court Equal Protection Doctrine. In the seminal case of Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a North
Carolina reapportionment plan that would have included two majori68
ty-black congressional districts. The plan ostensibly was designed to
give voting strength to African-American voters in North Carolina,
69
who were otherwise dispersed throughout the state. In other words,
the plan had its root in a purpose beneficial to African-American voters.
The Court held that the districts, which were oddly shaped in order to encompass prospective African-American voters “who are oth70
erwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries,”
gave rise to a valid claim of improper racial gerrymandering under
71
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that the majorityminority redistricting plan “reinforces the perception that members
of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the

67

68
69
70
71

uation in which the only African-American students in a particular class were all assigned
to a section taught by the only African-American teacher available in that grade).
Social science indicates that individuals exhibit in-group bias, including the belief that
members of the same group are more trustworthy. See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara,
A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1739–40 (2006). The employer in
this hypothetical could be acting pursuant to this bias and/or, citing to such studies, operating under the supported belief that the customer base will possess this bias.
509 U.S. 630, 633–34 (1993).
Id. at 634–35.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 657–58.
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polls.” 72 “[S]uch perceptions,” the Court continued, must be rejected
73
“as impermissible racial stereotypes.” Indeed, the Court explained
that “racial bloc voting and minority-group political cohesion never
can be assumed . . . .” 74 The Court made clear that “the individual is
75
important, not his race, his creed, or his color.”
Two years later, the Court, in Miller v. Johnson, assessed the constitutionality of a Georgia redistricting plan that would have created
76
The Court struck down the
three majority-black voting districts.
77
Acplan, applying and reaffirming the rule announced in Shaw.
cording to the Miller Court, “[w]hen the State assigns voters on the
basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption
that voters of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
78
at the polls.’” Further, the Court noted, “Race-based assignments
‘embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their
race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history
79
More directly, the Court explained that
and the Constitution.’”
“[t]he idea is a simple one: ‘At the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a
80
racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Shaw and Reno are examples of the Court’s recognition of the diversity of viewpoints within a
race and thereby examples of the operation of a constitutional rule
that rejects the notion that there are monolithic racial views, atti81
tudes, or behaviors.
Voting is not the only context in which this rule has been recognized by the Supreme Court. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court deter-

72
73
74

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 649.
Miller, 509 U.S. at 649.
Id. at 652. But see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA.
L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1991) (“The assumption that blacks, wherever they reside, tend to be
politically cohesive is supported both anecdotally and empirically.”).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id. at 913.
Id. at 911–12 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
Id. at 912 (citations omitted) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 602
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006) (“We do a
disservice to . . . important goals by failing to account for the differences between people
of the same race.”).
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mined that a defendant could object on equal protection grounds to
a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, where the challenges
82
excluded potential jurors of the same race as the defendant. The
Court held that the prosecutor could not, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, categorically assume that jurors would be sympathetic to a defendant of the same race: “[The] Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a
83
black defendant.” Moreover, the Court said, it “prohibits a State
from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes . . . .” 84 The Court clarified that attorneys could “obtain possibly
85
relevant information about prospective jurors,” but, quoting Justice
Felix Frankfurter, the Court announced that “[a] person’s race simp86
ly ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.’”
Whereas Batson concerned a situation in which the defendant
(black) was the same race as the excluded jurors (black), the Court
later took up the open question of whether the Equal Protection
Clause permits a defendant (white) to use peremptories to exclude
87
jurors of a different race (black). The Court held that “the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State’s peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased per88
sons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race . . . .” In doing
so, the Court emphasized that an individual of a given race cannot be
deemed categorically unable to serve on a jury: “[r]ace cannot be a
89
proxy for determining juror bias or competence.” Again, “where
racial bias is likely to influence a jury, an inquiry must be made into

82
83
84
85
86

87
88
89

476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 89 n.12.
Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990) (noting that a prosecutor’s
“assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black”
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
Id.
Id.; see also Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 69, 80 (1996) (“The view that Black jurors vote for Black defendants regardless
of the evidence assumes that a monolith of values exists among Blacks based on a shared
demographic feature, such as race, and ignores a wide diversity among Blacks on the
same list of issues which diversifies Whites, including political, social, and economic status.”).
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such bias,” rather than presumed solely because of the racial identity
90
of the prospective juror.
Such negative presumptions, regretfully replete in American his91
tory, are no longer tolerated. In the words of the Supreme Court,
they “force[] individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities” and they “deprive[]
92
persons of their individual dignity . . . .” The presumptions brand
members of a race with blanket attributes, reduce the individual to an
undifferentiated part of a racial whole, consider the individual fungible, and fail to honor the autonomy and distinctiveness of the indi93
vidual.
Perhaps the most pernicious example of a rule prohibiting the attachment of a stereotypical meaning on racial identity, ironically, is
94
when the Court fell woefully short of honoring it.
90
91

92
93

94

Powers, 499 U.S. at 415.
For example, as to African Americans, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407
(1857) (“[African Americans] had been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and
so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . .”);
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, vol. 1 ch. XVIII (1835) (“[T]he European is to the other races of mankind what man himself is to the lower animals: he
makes them subservient to his use, and when he cannot subdue he destroys them. Oppression has, at one stroke, deprived the descendants of the Africans of almost all the
privileges of humanity.”). As to Native Americans, see United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28, 39 (1913) (“Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive
modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetishism, and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, [Native Americans] are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.”); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517,
525 (1877) (stating that Native Americans belong to “an ignorant and dependent race”).
As to Asian Americans, see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898)
(Fuller, J., dissenting) (opining that Chinese Americans belong to “a distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in our land,” claiming that they were “unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people”); People v. Hall, 4
Cal. 399, 404–05 (Cal. 1854) (describing the Chinese as “a distinct people . . . whose
mendacity is proverbial; a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who
are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown . . . [and] between whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable
difference”).
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“To whatever racial
group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and
respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of
public decisionmaking.”) (plurality opinion). Justice William Brennan, for example, said,
“[G]overnment may not, on account of race, insult or demean a human being by stereotyping his or her capacities, integrity, or worth as an individual.” MARK TUSHNET, MAKING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at
126 (1997) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally Stephen G. Breyer, Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York: Liberty, Security, and the Courts (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.
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In Korematsu v. United States, the Court was asked to review the
constitutionality of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s infamous
executive order authorizing the removal of “all individuals of Japa95
nese ancestry” from certain western areas of the nation. The Court
dismissed the suggestion that the order was grounded in blanket racial animus against the Japanese, holding instead that the order was
based on the pressing military reality that the United States was “at
96
war with the Japanese Empire.” Similarly, shortly before Korematsu,
the Court in Hirabayashi v. United States upheld the conviction of an
American citizen of Japanese ancestry for violating curfew requirements imposed on individuals of Japanese descent in those same
97
western regions. In doing so, the Court observed, “We cannot close
our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of war
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a
98
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry.”
The dissenting Justices in Korematsu did not buy the argument that
the internment of over 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry could
be constitutionally sanitized by military realities. They expressed
doubt that the government could append categorical concerns to an
entire race of individuals without particularized evidence of individual wrongdoing. In his dissent, Justice Robert Jackson declared that “if
any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is
99
personal and not inheritable.” Justice Frank Murphy, in his dissent,
observed that the “forced exclusion was the result in good measure of
this erroneous assumption of racial guilt, rather than bona fide mili100
As proof, Justice Murphy pointed to a military retary necessity.”
port which categorized “all individuals of Japanese descent as ‘subver101
sive,’ as belonging to ‘an enemy race . . . .”
Korematsu and Hirabayashi may be contrasted with Ex Parte Mitsuye
Endo, in which an individual of Japanese ancestry filed a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to be released from an internment camp located in
102
As the government conceded that Endo was “a loyal
California.

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html (describing Korematsu as a “decision we now recognize as shameful” and observing that “Korematsu now represents the
kind of constitutional decision that courts should seek to avoid”).
323 U.S. 214, 216–17 (1944).
Id. at 223.
320 U.S. 81, 86 (1943).
Id. at 101.
323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 235–36 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
323 U.S. 283, 284–85 (1942).
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and law-abiding citizen,” 103 the Court ordered that Endo be re104
Rather than making decisions upon individual circumleased.
stances, as in Endo, or otherwise presume innocence in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the government in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi presumed disloyalty and subversive tendencies of members of an entire community. Korematsu and Hirabayashi serve as distressing examples of the dangers of using race as a proxy for negative
characteristics.
In short, the Court has stated that, under the Equal Protection
Clause, it is impermissible to hold that individuals of the same race
think or act alike, or that race can be used as a proxy for certain ide105
as, attitudes, or experiences. Qualities or traits instead must be determined on an individual basis. In the words of Ralph Richard
Banks, “[T]reat[ing] individuals on the basis of group generalizations
that might not apply to any particular individual, perhaps represents
the paradigmatic harm that antidiscrimination law, including [the]
106
Equal Protection Clause, is thought to guard against.”
In our hypothetical, the school does precisely this by presuming
the African-American candidate’s ability to generate trust and cooperation solely on the basis of racial identity and without regard to individual traits. The “external legitimacy” rationale embodies such a
racial presumption and thus cannot be squared with a rule that forbids a state actor from attaching a monolithic meaning on a given
107
race.

103
104
105

106
107

Id. at 294.
Id. at 297.
See Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059,
2060 (1996) (“A huge chunk of equal protection law (and antidiscrimination law more
generally) is aimed precisely at barring the use of reasonable, unbigoted judgments that
race is a valid proxy for experiences, outlooks, or ideas.”); id. at 2062 (“One of the great
tasks of antidiscrimination law over the past thirty years has been to persuade people that
they ought not use race and sex as proxies, even when race and sex are statistically plausible proxies.”).
R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1091–92 (2001).
A thoughtful commentator asks whether an individual who benefits from the positive racial presumptions may effectively “waive” any constitutional objections to the application
of the “external legitimacy” to his or her circumstances. To this, it may be answered that
such a waiver was not contemplated by the Court in any of its seminal decisions relating
to race-based presumptions. For example, a Japanese-American citizen’s acquiescence to
forced exclusion or an African American’s willingness to go along with segregation without raising a fuss does not change the problematic constitutional nature of the underlying actions. Moreover, and in any case, there are other harms that extend beyond the
advantaged race which cut against the “external legitimacy” doctrine, even if the concerns
associated with the beneficiary of the presumptions are neutralized.
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In addition, social norms reinforce the problematic nature of presuming that individuals of a particular race possess certain desired
qualities. In The Office, a popular, recently completed depiction of an
ordinary workplace, the manager, Michael Scott, characteristically
crosses social boundaries and his breaches include various presump108
For example, Scott presumes that Stanley Hudtions tied to race.
109
son, an African-American salesman, is good at basketball and has an
110
Scott presumes that Darryl Philbin, an African“urban vibe.”
111
American foreman-turned-executive, is familiar with rap music, and
112
Further, Scott presumes Oscar Marhas experience with gangs.
tinez, an Mexican-American accountant, will bring his “famous His113
panic cleaning ethic” to the office’s spring cleaning efforts, and
Scott presumes that Kelly Kapoor, an Indian-American customer rela114
tions representative, knows the origins of a Hindu religious holiday.
It is precisely because of the audience’s understanding of prevailing
social norms governing race that Scott’s lack of self-awareness as to
racial matters is so evident and discomforting.
More recently and back in the realm of real world situations, an
Asian American wrote an essay on his own experiences with identitybased presumptions. The author acknowledged that he initially
struggled as a computer programmer, but that he was given the benefit of the doubt because he had the “privilege of implicit endorse115
ment.” This slack was based on the presumption that he was capable at programming because, as an Asian American, he “fit society’s
image of a young programmer.” 116
These social examples demonstrate the problematic nature of
presuming, without an inquiry into the actual qualities of the individual, that a member of a given race has certain favorable or desired
qualities. These social norms therefore support the constitutional

108

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

116

See Bill Chappell & Carolyn Beeler, Should ‘The Office’ Be Used In HR Training?, NPR (Jan.
14, 2010, 6:15 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122494690
(suggesting that, because of the offensive comments made in the series, “The Office can be
seen as a primer for everything you shouldn’t do at work”).
The Office: Basketball (NBC television broadcast Apr. 19, 2005).
The Office: Local Ad (NBC television broadcast Oct. 25, 2007).
Id.
The Office: Did I Stutter? (NBC television broadcast May 1, 2008).
The Office: The Secret (NBC television broadcast Jan. 19, 2006).
The Office: Diwali (NBC television broadcast Nov. 2, 2006).
Philip Guo, Silent Technical Privilege, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:33 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/01/programmer_privilege
_as_an_asian_male_computer_science_major_everyone_gave.single.html.
Id.
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rule that a monolithic understanding of racial identity has no place in
our legal system or society.
2. The Performance Problem
Another problem with the hypothetical situation offered is that
the school will not only presume that the African-American teacher
possesses the desired traits, as described above in Part II.A.1, but will
effectively demand that the employee activate those traits in order to
achieve the outcome sought by the employer. In other words, the African-American teacher will be expected to act according to the set of
characteristics presumed to be held by the employee. Indeed, an
employer may hire an individual not because of his or her qualities
alone, but because of how those qualities manifest themselves for the
benefit of the employer. In other words, the employee will be ex117
Contemporary understandings of race indipected to “perform.”
cate that racial performance is a tangible phenomenon and identifiable harm in law and society.
In academic literature, “performance” refers to the extent to
which an individual conforms to social expectations tied to the individual’s race. These social expectations relate to both an individual’s
thoughts and ideologies, and to the individual’s behavior or appearance. If an individual aligns with such expectations to a satisfactory
extent, he or she attains credibility commensurate with the degree of
conformance. By contrast, an individual who fails to conform may be
deemed to be not truly or genuinely part of the analyzed racial cate118
gory.
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, perhaps the most preeminent
119
legal scholars on the subject of performance, explain that these external expectations impose pressure on the individual to “work” his
117

118

119

See, e.g., Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 472 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying summary judgment in a Title VII case, in which a Chinese employee was expected to live up
to expectations, in the words of the employer, that “Chinese work very hard, and for a
long time, and the people who really produce results are these Chinese people”).
See Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
55, 79 (2006) (“[R]acial identification arms identifiers with a unique ‘constellation of
manifestations’ that exacerbate in-group favoritism and out-group derision.”).
Their scholarship on performance includes: Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at
Work: Remembering David Charny, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 13 (2001); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757
(2003) (reviewing FRANCISCO VALDES ET AL., CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)).
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or her racial identity: to maximize behavior that lines up with the external expectations and to minimize or downplay conduct that does
120
(The latter practice of
not accord with the external expectations.
hiding elements of racial identity that may be less palatable to others
121
An individual, in
is what Kenji Yoshino has coined “covering.”)
other words, is not free to act but is compelled to respond to external
expectations about how an individual of his or her race should behave. Those restraints, and the commensurate adjustments, are problematic in that they are the product of presumptions of standard racial thought or action and inhibit the ability of the individual to think
122
or act according to the dictates of individual conscience.
Expectations of performance abound in contemporary American
society. This is perhaps no more evident than in persistent conversations about the “blackness” of President Barack Obama. President
Obama’s emergence on the political stage and ascendance to the
presidency were accompanied by charges that he was “too black” or
123
For example, one commentator declared,
not “black enough.”
“when black Americans refer to Obama as ‘one of us,’ I do not know
what they are talking about,” suggesting that President Obama has
124
not “lived the life of a black American.”
The challenge to President Obama’s racial identity is but one recent example of a long line of such inquiries as to the sufficiency of
racial performance of public figures. These examples follow charges
125
that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, former Secre-

120
121
122

123

124

125

Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White? Re-thinking Race in Post-Racial America 1–
16 (2013).
See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (explaining that covering occurs when someone downplays underlying parts of their identity).
It is true that society may shape or at least inform individual thought and action such that
it would not be realistic to conceive of the individual as an abstract organism entirely independent of social influences. But where those influences are tied to race, a social construct, and suspect and highly dangerous trait that is irrelevant to the individual’s abilities, those particular restraints are of a different, and problematic nature.
See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Is Obama Black Enough?, TIME, Feb. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1584736,00.html; Rachel L. Swarns,
‘African-American’ Becomes A Term for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/us/african-american-becomes-a-term-for-debate.
html.
Stanley Crouch, What Obama Isn’t: Black Like Me, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, available
at
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/opinions/obama-isn-black-race-article1.585922.
See DINESH D’SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 479
(1996) (listing criticisms of the Justice Thomas’s blackness, including the view that he has
“ceased to be an African American”).
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tary of State Colin Powell, 126 and former Secretary of State Con127
doleezza Rice, to name just a few, fell short of social expectations of
“blackness.”
Such demands of racial authenticity are not exclusive to African
128
129
Americans. Mitt Romney and Rudolph Giuliani encountered
130
views that they are not “white enough,” Ted Cruz and Miguel Estra131
132
da that they are not “Hispanic enough,” and Elizabeth Warren
133
Biracial individuals stand at the
that she is not “Native enough.”
crossroads of these expectations, being, for example, neither “black
134
Notions of racial
enough” nor “white enough” at the same time.
performance are found in elements of popular culture. In contemporary modern culture, perhaps no character was weighed by expectations of racial performance more than Carlton Banks—the affluent,
well-educated, well-dressed, and articulate, Tom Jones-loving Repub-

126

127
128

129
130

131

132

133

134

See Chris Cillizza, Colin Powell’s (Overlooked) Call to Action on Race, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/14/colinpowells-overlooked-call-to-action-on-race; see also Condoleezza Rice is a House Negro, SUEDE
(2005), reprinted in TOURÉ, NEVER DRANK THE KOOL-AID: ESSAYS 317 (2007).
See id.
See Alex Pareene, Romney:
Not White Enough?, SALON (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/11/09/weekly_standard_republicans_must_play_white_ide
ntity_politics_better_next_time/.
See Terry Moran, Is Giuliani “White” Enough?, ABC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2007, 4:15 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/02/is_giuliani_whi.
See Aaron Blake, Bill Richardson: Ted Cruz Should Not ‘Be Defined as a Hispanic,’ WASH.
POST, May 6, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2013/05/06/bill-richardson-ted-cruz-should-not-be-defined-as-a-hispanic/.
See 149 CONG. REC. S2085 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2003) (citing Byron York, Dems to Miguel Estrada:
You’re not Hispanic Enough, NAT’L REV., Feb. 6, 2003, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205824/dems-miguel-estrada-youre-nothispanic-enough/byron-york).
Though “Hispanic” describes an ethnicity, I treat it, as other scholars have, as a race for
purposes of this Article. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469, 470 n.2 (2010) (adopting a “functional definition” of Latino/Latina as a race).
See Stephanie Siek, Who’s a Native American? It’s Complicated, CNN (May 14, 2012),
http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/14/whos-a-native-american-itscomplicated/comment-page-1 (discussing the cultural and ancestral components of Native American tribal citizenship).
See KATHLEEN ODELL KORGEN, FROM BLACK TO BIRACIAL: TRANSFORMING RACIAL IDENTITY
AMONG AMERICANS 63 (1998) (“There are hardships . . . that are unique to biracial individuals. They may experience a sense of isolation, feeling ‘not quite black enough’ when
around black people and ‘not quite white enough’ when around white individuals. In
turn, both blacks and whites may encourage this sense of isolation by either declaring
outright or implying that biracial people are not white or black enough.”).
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lican from the popular, now off-air Fresh Prince of Bel-Air television se135
ries.
In our running hypothetical, the school has hired an African
American on the premise that the African American has the necessary qualities that will produce trust and cooperation amongst parents (the issue of monolithic racial meaning described in Part II.A.1).
Moreover, the employer expects the African-American employee,
once hired, to demonstrate those traits, such that trust and cooperation can flourish in actuality. The African-American employee thus
has external pressure to act in accordance with those expectations
and exhibit the desired traits, even if the individual himself or herself
does not have, or is not inclined to express, those traits. The employee, furthermore, may face adverse consequences if he or she does not
conduct himself or herself in the manner that comports with the employer’s expectations.
In general, it is the expectation of conduct based on race that
gives rise to a cognizable issue under the “performance” rationale.
To be clear, the problematic nature of the performance described
here does not change because the expectation here is “positive,”
which is to say the employer expects the employee to act in a prized
manner advantageous to the employer. The impermissible aspects of
race-based performance are with the expectation of action, the pressure to so act, and the tangible consequences that lie above the head
of the employee should he or she deviate from those expectations.
3. The Negative Presumption Problem
To recap thus far, the school officials’ employment action is problematic because it presumes that African Americans categorically possess a desired trait due to race, without regard to the individual qualities or abilities of the candidate (Part. II.A.1) and expects the African-

135

Throughout the run of The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, Carlton’s blackness was front and center.
Will Smith, the protagonist of the series, poked fun at Carlton’s blackness, quipping, for
example, “Roses are red, violets are blue, Jazz and I are black, but Carlton, what are you?”
The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air: Def Poet’s Society (NBC television broadcast Oct. 22, 1990). In
one particularly serious episode, Carlton pledged a black fraternity, only to be rejected
because a frat elder did not want to include someone characterized by “Ralph Lauren
shirts, wing-tipped shoes, and corporate America,” declaring finally that he would not
admit a “sell-out” into his fraternity. The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air: Blood is Thicker than Mud
(NBC television broadcast Nov. 1, 1993). Carlton responded, “Being black isn’t what I’m
trying to be, it’s what I am.” Id. The episode offered the poignant observation that an
individual need not perform in a certain or specified way in order to be an accepted or
authentic member of a racial group.
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American employee, once hired and because of race, to perform the
presumed trait (Part II.A.2). What of the Asian-American applicant?
The school officials are seeking a second-grade teacher that,
among other things, will be able to produce trust and cooperation
from a predominantly African-American parent population. Further,
as noted in Part II.A.1, the employer presumes that an AfricanAmerican candidate, solely because of this candidate’s race, has the
coveted trait that will be able to generate such trust and cooperation
from the parents. Necessarily, the employer presumes that the AsianAmerican applicant, again solely on the basis of race, does not have
the trait that may enhance trust or cooperation from the AfricanAmerican parents.
The problem with presuming that the Asian American does not
have certain favored qualities is the same as with the presumption
that the African American does: the presumption that certain traits
categorically follow racial identity—that person of race x reliably has
characteristic y, or that person of race z reliably does not have characteristic y, without regard to the particulars of the person and relying
solely on racial identity to make these twin judgments. As explained
in Part II.A.1, these viewpoints are inconsistent with a constitutional
principle that monolithic qualities cannot be presumed on the basis
of race. Part II.A.3 indicates that when this principle is violated, the
violation is double: members of a given race are deemed to possess a
sought-after quality, and, simultaneously, the decisionmaker presumes that individuals of other races do not possess that same desired
quality.
4. The Equal Consideration Problem
There are tangible consequences from the operation of these dual
presumptions. In particular, an individual presumed, on the basis of
race, to possess a valued characteristic (as noted in Part II.A.1) will be
favored in hiring. Individuals who are presumed, on the basis of
race, to not possess a desired trait (as noted in Part II.A.3) are at a
disadvantage in the hiring process. In our hypothetical, the AsianAmerican applicant, who may have the qualities that are preferred by
the school and that may give rise to a strengthened relationship between the school and the parents, is denied equal consideration for
the position and may be excluded from the employment opportunity.
This effect cannot be squared with the Constitution.
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“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all
136
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” But this guiding
principle that similarly situated individuals be treated the same is not
absolute. Indeed, there are circumstances under which a state actor
may treat similarly situated individuals differently in a manner con137
The question becomes
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
whether the denial of equal opportunity to an individual who is presumed not to possess a coveted characteristic—the Asian-American
applicant in our hypothetical—falls within one of those circumstances and thus is valid for constitutional purposes.
When the different treatment is premised on race, courts require
that the state actor advance a “compelling” justification for the differential treatment and show that the means chosen are “narrowly tai138
The Supreme Court has
lored” in service of the compelling end.
identified a limited set of reasons that are sufficiently “compelling” to
justify race-based differential treatment. First, the Court has held that
an institution of higher education may take race into account in admissions in order to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse stu139
Second, whereas colleges and universities may engage
dent body.
in this form of forward-looking race-conscious admissions, the Court
has held that a state employer may only use race in hiring for backward-looking reasons; that is, to remedy past discrimination for which
140
it is responsible. Third, the Court has deferred to national security
136
137

138

139

140

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
See Enguist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (“When those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at
least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to legislation
or regulation are indeed being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.’”
(citation omitted)).
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that universities can take race
into account when making admissions decisions where the “narrowly tailored use of race”
is “to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits” of a diverse student body).
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989) (holding that a city
cannot take race into account when making procurement decisions without identifying
past discrimination that is in need of remediation). The Equal Protection Clause applies
only to governmental actors. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to all employers, public or private, with at least fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Title VII
is read to be narrower and stricter than the Equal Protection Clause. See Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6 (1987) (noting that Congress intended Title VII principles to apply to both governmental and private employers). Accordingly, private employers as compared to public employers enjoy no more opportunity, other than this single remedial exception, to use race in its decisionmaking.

1364

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:5

exigencies and permitted the government to consider race in the execution of wartime policies, such as the curfew imposed on and in141
ternment of individuals of Japanese ancestry.
It is worth noting that five Justices of the Supreme Court would
have found a fourth compelling justification for racial discrimination:
public school districts’ use of race-conscious assignments as a response to racial imbalances in the districts’ schools, where the districts’ use of race would be voluntary, that is to say not directed by a
142
As these five Justices’ views
court-ordered desegregation decree.
were not part of the holding of the Court, this particular justification
143
for race-based discrimination is not the law of the land.
On the other side of the coin, the Court has explicitly rejected a
“role model” rationale as a constitutional justification for a racial classification. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a school board argued, in defense of its race-conscious employment policies, that it
had a compelling state interest “in providing minority role models for
its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination race . . . .” 144 The Court ruled, however, that this justification could only support a racial classification if the school board’s
policies were designed to remedy “particularized findings” of the
145
school board’s prior racial discrimination.
The three available reasons to treat individuals differently on the
basis of race—race-conscious admissions in higher education, raceconscious remedies in employment for past discrimination for which
141

142

143

144
145

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943). It should be added that in Johnson v. California,, the Court held
that strict scrutiny was the proper standard that governed the use of race by penal institutions. 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005). The Court did not rule, on the merits, that the use of
race in the penal context constituted a compelling state interest. Id. at 515.
See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and
expertise, may choose to pursue.”); id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting, with the
support of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, that the Court has “approved of ‘narrowly tailored’ plans that are no less race conscious” than the one at hand).
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who concurred in part and concurred in the judgment of the
Court, thus giving the Court a majority for purposes of striking down the assignment
plans on narrow tailoring grounds, would have held, along with the dissenting justices
that public school districts possess a compelling state interest in eliminating de facto racial isolation. Id. at 797.
476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
Id. at 276; id. at 274 (“This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing
of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.”). Whether the “external
legitimacy” rationale survives post-Wygant is highly debatable.
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the employer is responsible, and race-conscious national security
146
practices —do not encompass the race-based different treatment
contemplated by the “external legitimacy” doctrine, which is a forward-looking enterprise that is attractive for the benefits it may
achieve among an external constituency and is not a backwardlooking remedial response to a state actor’s own past racial discrimi147
Accordingly, without needing to proceed to the narrowlynation.
tailored prong of the equal protection analysis, it appears that the
“external legitimacy” doctrine cannot be reconciled with prevailing
148
constitutional jurisprudence. The denial of equal consideration of
the hypothetical Asian-American candidate, therefore, would be a
149
cognizable constitutional problem.

146

147

148

149

Leading constitutional scholars agree that there are only three such acceptable departures from the constitutional ban on the use of race by state actors. See, e.g., MICHAEL
STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1403 (2d ed., 2013)
(enumerating the same three compelling state interests).
See Hershell Gill Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in higher education
affirmative action does not modify the Court’s rulings on racial classifications in employment).
Indeed, courts blessing the “external legitimacy” doctrine have seemingly applied an odd
form of strict scrutiny that arguably does not conform to this exacting, searching review.
See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (asking whether the government’s
operational needs argument is “motivated by a truly powerful and worthy concern” and
whether “the racial measure that they have adopted is a plainly apt response to that concern”). The Court has insisted that strict scrutiny be applied correctly. See Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (remanding the case because the circuit
court improperly deferred to state university on narrowly tailoring prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis).
It would present a statutory problem as well. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). An
employment action predicated on the notion that only members of one race shall be given special consideration amounts to a view that the racial identity of the applicant or employee is a “bona fide occupational qualification,” or BFOQ. Id. § 2000e-2(e). Title VII
permits an employer to treat individuals differently on account of a protected trait if the
trait “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .” Id. That said, race is not among the
traits which Title VII recognizes under the BFOQ exception to discrimination, thus excluding by implication race as a valid BFOQ in employment. See id. Accordingly, an employer may not use race as a BFOQ as a shield from general statutory prohibitions on
employment discrimination. At most, race in employment can be used only in truly extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 173–74 (5th ed. 2001) (suggesting that race may
be a BFOQ in the hiring of actors where physical appearance is critical to the role).
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5. The Race Defining Problem
The external legitimacy doctrine not only presumes that individuals of a given race possess certain desired characteristics (Part II.A.1)
and presumes that individuals of other races do not possess those
same desired characteristics (Part II.A.3), but also affixes a particular
(not just monolithic) meaning on the individuals’ races, thus withdrawing from these individuals the ability to determine what their
race means for external purposes. In other words, the “external legitimacy” doctrine bestows on the decision maker, such as the employer,
the power to ascertain the substantive contents of a particular racial
150
identity.
In our hypothetical, the employer is able to presume, simply on
the basis of racial identity, that an African-American candidate is able
to produce affection among African-American parents and that an
Asian-American candidate is unable to generate that similar relationship. In other words, the employer is categorically assuming from the
race of the applicant that an individual has or does not have a personal attribute, without the applicant having done or said anything in
reference to or support of that link. The employer instead has relied
on the actual or perceived racial identity of the applicant to make a
determination and in that sense has attached a specific meaning to
151
the applicant’s race.
Yet, it should be the candidate who should define not only what
race he or she wishes to be affiliated with, but also what it means to
152
For example, an employer
be a member of that identified race.
may presume that, ‘Because an applicant is race x, he or she possesses
150

151

152

The Court in Grutter said, “Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own,
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). While this may
be true, it should be the province of the individual to determine whether and how it matters inasmuch as he or she is being evaluated by others. The individual may articulate
some or all of those “unique experiences,” or may make a conscious decision to mark
some or all of those experiences as private and “off-limits” for external knowledge or consideration.
Indeed, the employer has not only reduced the applicant’s race to a singular interest in
ascertaining whether a desired trait is present, but in doing so has commodified that racial identity. This “instrumental” use of race, Nancy Leong points out, “is antithetical to a
view of . . . race . . . as a personal characteristic intrinsically deserving of respect.” Leong,
supra note 15, at 2155.
Even if racial identity is not developed in a vacuum, and instead is developed in relation
to external realities, this Part addresses itself to the dangers of imposing meaning of racial
identity on an individual and to limiting that undue outside influence on identity formation.
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trait y,’ and that ‘Because an applicant is race z, he or she does not
possess trait y.’ The possession or non-possession of y should be for
the applicant to demonstrate, rather than be categorically presumed
153
on account of his or her racial identity. More specifically, the African-American candidate should be able to make plain that he or she
has the interest in and abilities to provoke trust and cooperation
among parents, and the Asian American should be able to make that
same showing as well—on equal terms as other applicants, that is
without the benefit or hindrance of any constructions of, or presumptions tied to, racial identity.
In the modern day, it is improper to impose a fixed, particular
meaning on the racial identity of another. This contemporary principle is best illustrated, as with Korematsu and Hirabiyashi in Part II.A,
by reference to historical cases in which the principle was flouted.
154
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court in 1896 reviewed the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that required “‘all railway
companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State’” to
“‘provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races,’” and that prohibited any individual from “‘occupy[ing]
seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on account
155
Homer Plessy sought to occupy the
of the race they belong to.’”
156
coach designated for white passengers, but was “required by the
conductor . . . to vacate said coach and occupy another seat in a
157
coach assigned . . . for persons not of the white race . . . .” Plessy asserted that “he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity se158
cured to citizens of the United States of the white race” because he

153

154
155
156
157
158

In the admissions context, the ability of colleges and universities to make judgments
about whether an applicant has valuable viewpoints on the basis of racial selfidentification alone and not the record perhaps helps explain Chief Justice John Roberts’s questions at oral argument in the Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin case, in which
he referred repeatedly to the fact that racial self-identification is on the front of an individual’s application for admission to the University of Texas. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, 33, 36, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–
345) (questioning by Chief Justice Roberts concerning an applicant’s checking of a box
to identify with a particular race); id. at 54 (asking “whether race is the only . . . holistic
factors that appears on the cover of every application”); see also id. at 35 (questioning by
Justice Antonin Scalia on the same topic); id. at 52 (exchange with Justice Alito on the
same topic).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. at 541.
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was “seven[-]eighths Caucasian and one[-]eighth African blood” 159
160
and “the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him . . . .”
The Court disagreed. First, the Court held that Plessy’s racial
identity was for Louisiana to decide: Whether a person is white or
black, the Court claimed, is “to be determined under the laws of each
[s]tate,” and that whether Plessy in particular “belongs to the white or
161
colored race” is a matter reserved for Louisiana. Second, the Court
held that the segregation of the railcars on the basis of race does not
162
offend the Equal Protection Clause.
Plessy warrants criticism for many reasons. Most relevant here, the
Court removed from Plessy the ability to define his racial identity
(white or black) and the meaning of that identity for external purposes (fit or unfit for sitting in particular railcars), and placed such
definitional and interpretive responsibilities in the hands of the State.
As Jonathan Kahn observes, the Court “depriv[ed] Plessy of control
over his own racial self-definition and subject[ed] him to forced sepa163
ration based on that definition.” “Thus,” Professor Kahn adds,
“Plessy was not just about segregating people based upon their racial
identity, it was also about establishing a legal framework for allocating
164
power to determine racial identity.” In short, Plessy imposed a statedetermined racial identity on Plessy, and exposed him to adverse
consequences as a result of that imposed racial identity.
165
In United States v. Thind, the Supreme Court in 1923 explored
whether Bhagat Singh Thind—who was described as a person “of
high caste Hindu stock, born in . . . India, and classified by certain
166
scientific authorities as of the Caucasian or Aryan race” —was
167
white. This question was of significance because, under the federal
immigration framework in place at the time, naturalization extended

159
160
161
162

163
164

165
166
167

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 550–51; see also Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 257 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the “ugly legacy”
of Plessy, specifically its holding that racially segregated schools may be equal under the
Equal Protection Clause).
Jonathan Kahn, Controlling Identity: Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 755, 758 (2005).
Id. at 765; see also Joshua Herman, Identifying Privacy: An Introduction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
657, 664 (2005) (observing that “identity was central to Plessy and by allowing the
states . . . to determine who was white and who was black, the courts enabled the states to
control identity by defining it and conditioning benefits on those determinations”).
261 U.S. 204 (1923).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 206.
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only to “aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African na168
tivity and to persons of African descent.” Thind did not claim to be
169
Accordingly, the Court noted
African, as he was born in India.
quite simply, “If the applicant is a white person . . . [,] he is entitled
170
to naturalization; otherwise not.”
In ascertaining whether Thind was white, the Court relied on the
“common” or “popular” usage of the term “white” because, in the
words of the Court, it is this meaning, not any scientific or formal interpretation, that “was within the contemplation of the framers of the
171
statute or of the people for whom it was framed.” Conceding that
172
this amounted to a “racial test,” the Court held that “white” was “intended to include only the type of man whom [the framers of the
173
statute] knew as white,” specifically immigrants primarily “from the
British Isles and Northwestern Europe, whence they and their for174
bears had come.” The Court explained that it was not establishing
any racial hierarchy, but merely acknowledging the “racial difference” between the whites and Indian Hindus that “the great body of
175
our people instinctively recognize . . . .”
Thind and Ozawa v. United States, a similar case involving an indi176
vidual from Japan who sought naturalization, have been discredited
because, in these cases, the Court defined (or allowed the state to define) the racial identity of an individual, withdrawing from the indi177
“As Ozawa and
vidual that solemn and personal determination.
Thind hinged on the matter of classification itself, they also provide a
unique opportunity to observe the Court-as-institution participating

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

30 U.S.C. § 2169 (1901) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316,
318).
Thind, 261 U.S. at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 209; see also id. (“The words of the statute are to be interpreted in accordance with
the understanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were taken.”).
Id.
Thind, 261 U.S. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 215.
260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (holding that a Japanese person is not Caucasian).
See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361, 1392 (2011) (“These cases did more than
define who was Asian (rather than White) and thus ineligible for naturalization, however.
They also reflected citizenship law’s power to construct and reify White domination and
supremacy.”). To be sure, in Thind the Court “defined ‘white’ through a process of negation, systematically identifying who was non-White.” IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27 (1996); see Thind, 261 U.S. at 215 (holding that “a
negative answer must be given to the . . . question” of whether Thind is white and therefore entitled to naturalization).
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in the process of racial formation,” Donald Braman writes. 178 In these
cases, the individual is both denied the ability to define his racial
identity and subject to adverse consequences as a result of the externally-dictated racial identity, namely the denial of naturalized citizenship.
Similarly, with respect to the “external legitimacy” doctrine, an
employer commits these double fouls: first, the employer dictates for
a candidate the meaning of his or her racial identity (i.e., that he or
she, because of his or her race, can or cannot trigger trust and cooperation); and second, the employer adds a tangible consequence to
the imposed construction of the applicant’s racial identity by denying
equal consideration for the position.
B. Social Costs
1. The Stereotype Entrenchment Problem
The harms of the “external legitimacy” doctrine explored thus far
concern the presumptions and operation of those presumptions as to
the existence or non-existence of a desired trait. What if the individual presumed to not have the particular trait does, in fact, have the
trait? In our hypothetical, what if the Asian-American applicant has
the demonstrated interest in and ability to generate trust and cooperation among predominantly African-American parents? For starters, due to the presumption that Asian-Americans cannot generate
trust or cooperation among African-American parents, the AsianAmerican applicant may be unable to make that case at all, or at a
minimum has more ground to cover in order to overcome the presumption.
Moreover, and most relevant here, to the extent that the Asian
American actually possesses, but is not afforded equal consideration
and denied employment, the harms of the “external legitimacy” doctrine extend beyond the Asian-American applicant to the school officials, students, and parents. In particular, the school officials, students, and parents are deprived of the opportunity to understand
and appreciate that a teacher of a different (and really any) race may
exhibit the concern and talents that are coveted and that may produce the affection wanted by and helpful to the school officials.
With the “external legitimacy” doctrine, the presumption that only individuals of the same race are going to care and be effective is re-

178

Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1401 (1999).
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inforced and hardened. At the same time, the knowledge that individuals of any race can serve the school’s needs and be successful
partners with parents is lost on various constituents and the opportunity to break down racial stereotypes is missed. Indeed, students,
179
who arguably may be the greatest beneficiaries of this lesson, are
not able to interact with, learn from, and be exposed to individuals of
different races, where that contact can be helpful to the development
and maturation of students in an increasingly diverse society and
180
world.
As the Court has suggested, racial classifications, if used, must tear
down, and not build up or strengthen, racial barriers to understand181
Indeed, if the value of diversity is to facilitate cross-racial ening.
gagement and awareness, it would stand to reason that a policy keeping individuals of the same race together and individuals of different
races apart would actively stifle the prospects for these social bene182
fits.
2. The Role Exclusion Problem
Social roles should be open to individuals of all races, without socially-imposed racial barriers to entry. For example, Doug Williams,
the first African American to be the starting quarterback of a Super
Bowl-winning team, where professional quarterbacks were generally
white, recalled how he was discussed prior to his historic victory:
179

180

181

182

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 865 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that, compared to higher education, “there is even
more to gain,” with respect to racial diversity in public primary and secondary schools);
id. at 840, 843 (commenting on the importance of “helping our children learn to work
and play together with children of different racial backgrounds,” “teaching children to
engage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make
a land of 300 million people one Nation,” and “help[ing] create citizens better prepared
to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds”); id. at
842 (“Primary and secondary schools are where the education of this Nation’s children
begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our
days.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless
our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to
live together.”).
See Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 744–46, 745–46 nn.70–76 (1998) (summarizing social science evidence
on the benefits of interracial interactions in the elementary and secondary school context).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (acknowledging the importance of
“cross-racial understanding,” breaking down racial stereotypes, and enabling students to
better understand persons of different races).
See id. at 331–32 (recognizing the importance of ensuring a diverse workforce and military leadership).
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“every article that was written, every adjective was ‘Tampa’s black
183
quarterback’ or ‘black quarterback Doug Williams . . . .”
Today,
however, “you don’t read about [quarterbacks] being black. They
just happen to be their quarterback, and I think that’s the way it
184
should be.”
Williams’s reflections speak to a transition that he
helped achieve and that should occur within each social role. While
progress has been made as to some roles, such advancements are not
complete.
Indeed, certain social roles remain the presumptive or exclusive
province of members of particular races. For example, basketball
player Jeremy Lin faced questions about his basketball bona fides due
185
to his Asian-American identity. As Williams suggests, Lin should be
assessed on the basis of his basketball skills, without his skills being
second-guessed on account of his identity. Eminem, who is Caucasian, has been seen as an “interloper” in the rap world. 186 Similarly,
American Idol contestant Gurpreet Singh Sarin, a turbaned Indian
American, was called “turbanator” and “turb” during his first appear187
Sarin should have been evaluated on the basis
ance on the series.
of his singing ability and personality, without encountering com188
In short, certain
ments about his turban as a cost of competing.
public arenas or spheres of activity should not be seen as dominant or
exclusive domains of particular races, and those of other races who

183

184
185

186

187

188

Greg Garber, Doug Williams Embraces History, ESPN.COM (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2012/story/_/id/8884695/super-bowl-xlvii-dougwilliams-embraces-history.
Id.
See Touré, Jeremy Lin’s Triumph Over Stereotype Threat, TIME, Feb. 28, 2012, available at
http://ideas.time.com/2012/02/28/jeremy-lins-triumph-over-stereotype-threat/ (noting
Lin’s difficulty convincing NBA teams of his abilities due to “the societal script that does
not expect Asian Americans to be pro-level basketball players”).
Nekesa Mumbi Moody, Feud Between Eminem and The Source Magazine Wounds on Both Sides,
ATHENS
(Feb.
7,
2004),
http://onlineathens.com/stories/020704/
ONLINE
ent_20040207005.shtml#.VSH6tBPF9v4.
See Gurpreet Singh Sarin American Idol Audition, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://youtu.be/FzbBmjxPODc (dubbing Sarin the “turbanator” and discussing his turban).
This aspiration is not limited to the racial context. Michael Sam, the college football
player who came out as homosexual prior to the National Football League draft, should
be assessed by professional teams on the basis of his football acumen and abilities, not his
sexual orientation. See Jeff Legwold, John Elway Says He Applauds Michael Sam, ESPN.COM
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://espn.go.com/blog/denver-broncos/post/_/id/5041/john-elwaysays-he-applauds-michael-sam (quoting Elway as saying, “we will evaluate Michael just like
any other draft prospect—on the basis of his ability, character and NFL potential. His announcement will have no effect on how we see him as a football player”). Nor should it.
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do not fit preconceived notions of proper inhabitants should not be
189
seen as exotic trespassers.
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence from the gender context helps explain that social roles should be open irrespective of
race. Two cases are particularly instructive in this regard. In Missis190
sippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court considered whether
the Mississippi University for Women’s nursing school could deny
191
admission to men and “limit[] its enrollment to women.” The university argued that its admissions policy “compensates for discrimina192
tion against women . . . .”
The Court was unpersuaded. The Court determined that the university had failed to demonstrate that sufficient discriminatory condi193
More imtions existed to justify a single-sex admissions policy.
portantly for our purposes, the Court held that the university’s
purportedly benign justification for the admissions policy had the effect of entrenching archaic and stereotypical views of women and female roles: “Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers
faced by women,” the Court said, the university’s “policy of excluding
males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate
194
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.” Hogan stands for the proposition that even benign explanations for categorical gender-based classifications may not be sustainable if the
classifications embody and entrench harmful stereotypes about the
presumptive place of men or women in our society. As racial classifications are subject to more demanding constitutional scrutiny as

189

190
191
192
193

194

As a recent example, prior to the 2014 Winter Olympics, an African-American reporter
for the Washington Post addressed how his interest in figure skating subverts stereotypical
notions that African Americans are not fans of the sport. See Robert Samuels, I’m Black.
I’m a Guy. And I’m Obsessed With Figure Skating, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-black-im-a-guy-and-im-obsessed-withfigure-skating/2014/01/30/1ddfafae-8819-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html. That the
author felt it necessary to dispel the notion that African Americans do not like figure skating speaks to the stubborn, wrongful belief that certain activities are proper, or not proper, for certain races.
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Id. at 720.
Id. at 727.
See id. at 729 (“Mississippi has made no showing that women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that field when
the [nursing school] opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such opportunities.”).
Id.
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compared to gender-based classifications, 195 Hogan applies with greater force in the racial context.
In United States v. Virginia, the Court appraised whether the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”), a public undergraduate institution
whose mission was to produce “citizen-soldiers,” could, consistent
196
with the Equal Protection Clause, limit enrollment to males. Virginia explained that VMI needed to categorically exclude females because “the unique VMI method of character development and leadership training, [referred to as] the school’s adversative approach,
197
would have to be modified were VMI to admit women.”
The Court rejected the argument that “VMI’s adversative meth198
od. . . cannot be made available, unmodified, to women,” holding
that Virginia could not “constitutionally deny to women who have the
will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI
199
The Court reasoned that even if “most women
uniquely affords.”
200
would not choose VMI’s adversative method,” Virginia could not
categorically assume that no women would be unable or unwilling to
satisfy VMI’s rigorous program designed for men and therefore exclude all women from admission. The Court pointed out, for example, that women have successfully entered “federal military academies,” “participat[ed] in the Nation’s military forces,” and “graduated
201
at the top of their class at every federal military academy.”
The Court emphasized that Virginia “may not exclude qualified
individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities
202
of males and females,’” or “rely on overbroad generalizations to
make judgments about people that are likely to. . . perpetuate histori203
cal patterns of discrimination.” That is precisely what Virginia did,
however. The Court concluded that Virginia’s “great goal” of maintaining an all-male military academy that uses the adversative method
“is not substantially advanced by women’s categorical exclusion, in to-

195

196

197
198
199
200
201
202
203

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996); id. at n.6 (“The Court has thus far
reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national
origin . . . .”).
See id. at 519 (framing the question before the Court as whether “the Constitution’s equal
protection guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique
educational opportunities VMI affords”).
Id. at 535 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 544; id. at 544 n.13.
Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
Id. at 542 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tal disregard of their individual merit . . . .” 204 Virginia establishes that
gender-based stereotypes cannot justify gender-based classifications
and that institutions must base decisions on the actual individual
qualities of applicants rather than categorical assumptions. Again,
this principle is only stronger in the race context due to the more rig205
id standard of review that applies to racial classifications.
The “external legitimacy” doctrine runs afoul of the principles
announced in Hogan and reinforced in Virginia. In particular, it operates on the premise that certain positions should be available (only
or preferably) to individuals who share the same racial identity as the
predominant racial identity of the community to be served. Following our hypothetical, the African-American applicant will be selected
for the position because of the marginal increase in the harmony between the racial identity of the teachers and the parents. In practical
terms, therefore, the position is functionally available to the applicant
who can enhance the extent to which the employer reflects the racial
composition of the parents.
But, all other qualities being equal, the African-American and
Asian-American applicants should stand on the same footing as it pertains to their prospective ability to be effectively teach and be members of the educational community. In short, the employment role
should be open to both on full and equal terms, without the position
being the presumptive or exclusive position of the applicant who
happens to have the same racial identity as the clients or customers.
C. Judicial Costs: The Judicial Validation Problem
206

The reality is that assumptions about race still exist in the world.
Race informs, whether consciously or not, a variety of judgments and
decisions, from opinions about people (e.g., whether they are dangerous or trustworthy, whether they are hard-working or lazy, wheth207
er they are “legal” or not, etc.), informal behaviors (e.g., whether
204

205
206

207

Id. at 546. At oral argument, counsel for the Department of Justice suggested that VMI
advanced stereotypical views of men as well: “[I] don’t think that you can have single sex
education that offers to men a stereotypical view of this is what men do,” i.e. participate in
the military and engage in rigorous training. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, United
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94–1941, 94–2107).
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 n.6 (“The Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial
scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin . . . .”).
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“It would ignore reality to suggest that
racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices
have been eliminated.”).
See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of
Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1311 (2004) (holding that certain races or ethnic groups
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we are going to cross the street or tighten our grip on our belongings
when a member of a given race approaches, whether we are going to
stop and help a pedestrian or stranded driver, whether we are going
to monitor with greater care a worker who is in or around our home,
208
etc.), and more formal judgments (e.g., whether we are going to
hire or promote someone, whether we are going to extend an offer of
admission to someone, whether we are going to vote for someone,
209
etc.). It is undeniable that race continues to matter in a host of dai210
ly and important ways.
The Supreme Court has understood that racial stereotypes persist
in modern American society. But, in addressing its role in relation to
these stereotypes, the Court has made clear that the courts cannot
endorse or facilitate the operation of those stereotypes. In Palmore v.
Sidoti, the Court was faced with a case in which a white mother had
the custody of her child revoked because she remarried a black
211
The courts below ruled that the custody determination was
man.
appropriate because the interracial remarriage was against the wishes
212
of the father, and would subject the child to social harms. The Su-

208

209

210
211
212

have been and continue to be stereotyped as disloyal); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I.
Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1548–49 (2011)
(“[L]argely absent from these debates is the fact that law enforcement personnel routinely employ Latino racial identity as a basis for determining whether a person is undocumented or illegal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren
v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1038 (2010)
(noting that “[i]mmigration officers today often rely on crude undocumented immigrant
profiles with race at their core”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1575, 1576 (2002) (suggesting that post-September 11, “persons who appear ‘Middle
Eastern, Arab, or Muslim’ . . . are identified as terrorists, and are disidentified as citizens”).
See Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: Anti-Black Theorizing and the Black
Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1995) (commenting that when white couples encounter a black male on the street, “men often clutch their women while the
women clutch their purses”); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1580–82 (2013) (noting that individuals are generally more likely to “perceive mildly aggressive behavior as more threatening when performed by a Black person than when performed by a White person”).
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 119 at 1292–93 (stating that attempts to
repudiate certain stereotypes may result in confirming another); Emma Reece Denny,
Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 347–48 (2012) (“Research focusing on stereotypes of
those who fall into more than one minority category show that non-White women and
men face different stereotypes than White women and men, and that these stereotypes
are more likely to lead to negative discrimination.”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (observing that, in our society, “race
unfortunately still matters”).
466 U.S. at 430–31.
Id. at 431.
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preme Court reversed, holding that the father’s or potential social
reactions were insufficient to divest the mother of custody. In particular, the Court acknowledged that racial stereotypes exist generally
213
and that the child in question may be stigmatized, but declared that
“[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
214
tolerate them.” Put differently, the Court declared, “Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
215
indirectly, give them effect.”
Justice Jackson similarly expressed concern in Korematsu that the
courts were being used as an instrument to enshrine into the Constitution the stereotype that individuals of Japanese race were disloyal
and suspicious. He wrote, “[I]f we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to
approve all that the military may deem expedient. That is what the
216
Further
Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not.”
into his Korematsu dissent, Justice Jackson explained that “once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that
the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination” that could be ex217
panded in future circumstances. That principle will not only grow
in substantive form, but will not be constrained temporally by the exigencies of the moment: “if we review and approve [racial discrimination], that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitu218
219
We now know that Justice Jackson was correct, and the
tion.”
Court as an institution and the Constitution as a shield of liberty suf213

214
215

216
217
218
219

See id. at 433 (“It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not
exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminated. There is a risk
that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or
ethnic origin.”).
Id.
Id. Public discrimination only facilitates private discrimination, creating a harmful feedback loop. See I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2011) (noting in particular that
“police profiling creates damaging feedback loop effects”).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244–45 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a (2006) (apologizing for internment of individuals of Japanese
ancestry during World War II); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989, (recognizing that “a grave injustice
was done to both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II” and that these actions
“were motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political
leadership”).
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fered as a result of the Court’s willingness to tolerate categorical views
220
premised on race.
In the public accommodations context, the Court has refused to
credit external, customer racial preferences, even when grounded in
evidence. For example, in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court addressed the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a restaurant
in Birmingham, Alabama that refused to serve African Americans in
221
The proprietor of the restaurant stated that only
the restaurant.
serving African Americans outside was premised on external reactions, not internal bias: permitting African-American customers inside, he said, would repel white customers and result in a loss of a
222
“substantial amount of business.” “I would refuse to serve a drunken man or a profane man or a colored man or anyone I felt would
223
damage my business,” he added. If the inside portion of the restaurant were to be opened to African Americans, he claimed, “his restaurant would be flooded with black customers . . . and his white cus224
tomers would cease their patronage as a result.”
The Court held that the statute applied to the restaurant, and was
unmoved by the externally-justified exclusion of African-American
225
customers from inside service. Deborah Rhode explains the courts’
refusal to accept private bias in cases of racial discrimination, particularly in the employment context:
During the early Civil Rights era, Southern employers often argued that
hiring blacks would be financially ruinous [as] white customers would go
elsewhere. In rejecting such customer preference defenses, Congress and
the courts recognized that the most effective way of combating prejudice
226
was to deprive people of the option to indulge it.

220
221
222
223

224
225
226

See Breyer, supra note 94.
379 U.S. 294, 295–97 (1964).
Id. at 297.
Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844, 1855 n.52
(2009) (quoting RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE
HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 78 (2001)).
Id. (quoting CORTNER, supra note 223 at 66).
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303–05.
Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (2009). For a
modern example of courts rejecting customer preferences as a valid justification for racebased employment actions, see Ray v. Univ. of Arkansas, 868 F.Supp. 1104, 1126–27
(E.D. Ark. 1994) (“[I]t is clear that there are some students at UAPB with a predisposition of racial animus toward white officers . . . . This form of ‘client’ preference is no
more permissible than any other, and will not justify the different treatment of white officers.”).
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In short, the courts cannot give legal credit or practical effect to racial stereotypes, to the extent that such biases continue to exist and
227
inform decisions in society.
This principle easily reaches the “external legitimacy” doctrine, as
our hypothetical demonstrates. An employer may want to hire an African-American employee to ostensibly satisfy a predominantly African-American parent base. And this decision may not be predicated
upon any personally-held positive view of African Americans or negative view of applicants of other races, such as Asian-Americans.
Moreover, there very well may be an empirical foundation for the belief that African-American parents respond better to AfricanAmerican teachers.
But, the rulings of the Court command that the courts cannot
sanction social assumptions about the attributes of members of a particular race, whether the assumptions are held by school officials or
the parents, or whether the assumptions are backed by data. In short,
racial stereotypes may exist, but the courts cannot actively validate or
perpetuate them. The “external legitimacy” embodies racial stereotypes, as Part II.A.1 (viz. desired race) and Part II.A.3 (viz. nondesired race) suggest.
* * *
To summarize the problems with the “external legitimacy” doctrine: with respect to the candidates, it presumes solely on the basis
of racial identity that an employee will generate good will on the part
of constituents who share the same race, compels this employee to act
and perform according to these race-based presumptions, presumes
solely on the basis of racial identity that an applicant of a different
race cannot generate to the same degree buy-in from the external
community, imposes a fixed meaning on racial identity of the applicants, and denies equal consideration to the non-desired applicant
and excludes that applicant from the position. With respect to society, it deprives the employer and the external constituency of the opportunity to understand that an individual of a different race may be
able to serve the interests and needs of the constituency, and reserves
social roles for members of particular races. With respect to the
courts, it draws the courts in to validate and advance private stereotypes predicated on race.

227

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“The impact [of race-based segregation] is greater when it has the sanction of the law . . . .”).
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III. APPLICATION
Part II discussed the constitutional and social issues with the “external legitimacy” doctrine to show the problematic nature of racial
mirroring. In Part III, I will apply the principles of Part II to the situation described at the beginning of this Article: the suggestion that
police departments reflect the racial composition of the served communities. Placing the requirement against these principles may help
explain exactly why this seemingly straightforward and sensible proposal is constitutionally unsound and counterproductive. This analysis also may help us further conceptualize the contents of and problems with racial mirroring more generally.
This Part also identifies important limits on the application of the
problems with racial mirroring. The problems with racial mirroring
apply, in theory, to hiring preferences in the tribal context and to
race-conscious admissions in higher education. But Congress has
made clear that tribal hiring preferences are shielded from antidiscrimination provisions. And race-conscious admissions policies are
justified on the basis of the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body, not a matching of the racial diversity of the student body to the racial diversity of the local community or nation.
Racial mirroring considerations may be useful nonetheless in identifying the costs of these approved forms of discrimination.
A. Law Enforcement
Each of the principles articulated in Part II applies to the suggestion that police officers should reflect the primary racial identity of
the communities which they serve.
To begin, the suggestion presumes that officers who reflect the
racial composition of the residents possess the ability to build trust
and generate good will among the served public, or at least do so to a
greater degree than officers of other races. This belief lacks evidentiary support. In the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri, the Washington Post reported that “there’s no conclusive evidence to show that white and black police officers treat
228
“[I]f anything,” the report continued,
suspects differently . . . .”
“some of the studies show that black officers can be harder on

228

Lydia DePillis, Do Diverse Police Forces Treat Their Communities More Fairly Than Almost-AllWhite Ones Like Ferguson’s?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2014, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/08/22/do-diverse-policeforces-treat-their-communities-more-fairly-than-all-white-ones-like-fergusons/.
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black criminal suspects.” 229 Accordingly, the presumption about officer buy-in would be predicated upon race alone and not upon the
individual qualities of the officers or upon evidence of officer behavior.
Next, performance is expected of the hired officers and these expectations arise only by virtue of the shared racial identity of the officers and the residents. An officer, in other words, would not be
hired or promoted merely because of the shared racial identity, but
because of what may spring from that shared racial identity. The
hired or promoted officer would be expected to produce the trust
and goodwill desired by the police department.
Moreover, the suggestion presumes that officers of races that do
not align with the primary race of the residents are not as able to engender trust among the served community. If there was not a belief
that officers of a different racial composition could not develop this
affection, the suggestion would be superfluous. The flip-side of the
premise that racial alignment would produce a healthy police force is
the presumption that officers out of sync with the residents’ racial
composition would not yield that assurance of effective and fair policing.
In addition, officers may be reassigned, not promoted, or not
hired on account of the presumption that they lack the ability to create “external legitimacy.” Equal opportunity in employment is thereby denied. It is true that, in circumstances other than termination or
a refusal to hire, officers may still be employed and that the harm
may be limited to reassignment as opposed to employment altogether. But one can imagine a situation in which departments, such as
smaller departments, have a limited ability to shuffle officers around
to match the racial composition of the community. In this situation,
the “external legitimacy” principle, if implemented, could lead to
non-promotion or non-hiring.
The suggestion also attaches an attribute—ability to produce positive relationships, or not—to the officers’ race. The suggestion therefore removes from the officers the authority to determine whether
their race will be assessed, and to define the meaning of their race.

229

Id. Put bluntly by The Atlantic’s Ta-Nehisi Coates, referencing police officers in a majorityblack suburb of Washington, DC, “Black Cops Can Be Brutal, Too.” Transcript Interview
by Norah O’Donnel with Ta-Nehisi Coates, CBS FACE THE NATION (Nov. 30, 2014), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-november-30-2014crump-tillis-peters-cupich/.
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Racial identity and the contents of that identity should be left to the
230
individual.
Moving to social costs, the residents are deprived of the opportunity to appreciate that officers of any race may be able to effectively
and fairly serve them. The suggestion thus perpetuates harmful beliefs that only individuals of the same race can do so, and reinforces,
rather than breaks down, barriers to cross-racial understanding.
In addition, the suggestion would effectively require that spaces
on the force be functionally reserved for individuals on the basis of
race, and specifically the racial composition of the residents. It is
true, however, that this general concern is that social roles—not assignments once those roles are obtained—are deemed to be the exclusive or presumptive province of members of a particular race. In
the police department context, one may say that the social role of police officer is open to all, and only particular assignments are closed
off or open to individuals on the basis of race. Accordingly, the relationship between this particular issue and the “external legitimacy”
principle may be seen as limited. But, as noted above, when the department is small or the served community racially homogeneous, reassignment may not be possible and the role of police officer may be
reserved altogether.
The third general problem with racial mirroring—the use of
courts as conduits for racial stereotypes—is applicable to the suggestion if the courts condone the suggestion. As noted in Part I, courts
have bought the external legitimacy rationale in the police context.
In sum, the “external legitimacy” doctrine applied to law enforcement embodies racial stereotypes, retards social progress, and
breaches the Equal Protection Clause’s essential command that individuals be treated as individuals rather than members of a racial
group with monolithic attributes, abilities, or experiences.
B. Tribal Employment
The “external legitimacy” doctrine may reach other practices or
policies in which the racial composition of one group is adjusted so as

230

See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION
333 (2003) (“A well-ordered multiracial society ought to allow its members free entry into
and exit from racial categories, even if the choices they make clash with traditional understandings of who is ‘black’ and who is ‘white,’ and even if, despite making such choices in good faith, individuals mislead observers who rely on conventional racial signaling.”).
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to reflect the racial composition of another group. But it is important to recognize the limits of the reach of the doctrine.
First, the principles of racial mirroring apply to tribal employment, but, by statute, Congress has insulated tribes and other employers “on or near” Indian tribes from general anti-discrimination
provisions. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), by its
231
own terms, exempts tribes from Title VII and also authorizes employers “on or near” Indian lands to favor Native-American appli232
cants. More specifically, to promote tribal sovereignty and the eco233
234
nomic independence of Native Americans, Title VII expressly
provides that the statute’s prohibition against discrimination in employment shall not “apply to any business or enterprise on or near an
Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living
235
Accordingly, to the extent that a tribal
on or near a reservation.”
employer engages in racial mirroring, Title VII cannot provide any
relief for aggrieved parties. In addition, according to the Supreme
236
Court, “Indian” is not a racial classification, but a political one.

231
232

233

234

235
236

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545–46 (1974) (“This [preference] reveals a clear
congressional recognition, within the framework of Title VII, of the unique legal status of
tribal and reservation-based activities.”). The author of the preference, Senator Karl
Mundt, declared that the preference “would provide to American Indian tribes in their
capacity as a political entity . . . to conduct their own affairs and economic activities without consideration of the [anti-discrimination] provisions of [Title VII].” Dille v. Council
of Energy Res. Tribes, 801 F.2d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 13702
(1964)).
The Senate sponsor, Hubert Humphrey, stated that the preference “is consistent with the
Federal Government’s policy of encouraging Indian employment . . . .” Morton, 417 U.S.
at 546 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964)). Senator Mundt stated that the preference “will assure our American Indians of the continued right to protect and promote
their own interests and to benefit from Indian preference programs now in operation or
later to be instituted.” Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 871–72 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
This bifurcated understanding also is noted by a federal district court. See Dille v. Council
of Energy Resource Tribes, 610 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Colo. 1985) (outlining the two purposes of the federal statute).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (2008).
See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (“Federal regulation of Indian
tribes . . . is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as
legislation of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians.’”); Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (“The
preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”).
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While the Indian preference is protected from challenge under
Title VII, the preference is not without significant costs. It is important to acknowledge the constitutional and social problems with
the preference. This is not to suggest that the purported benefits to
tribal sovereignty or tribal economic independence are not worth
these costs; only that the costs at least must be understood and appraised in any substantive discussion of the preference. The racial
mirroring conception is useful therefore as a means by which to appreciate these costs, even if the preference itself cannot be contested
in the courts by reference to racial mirroring.
Indeed, an employer “on or near” tribal lands may, as with any
other employer, hire or promote a member of a federally enrolled
tribe in order to cater to the predominantly Native-American clien237
tele that the employer serves. Writing about a precursor to the Indian preference in Title VII, Felix S. Cohen—revered as the “Black238
stone of American Indian law” —explained that:
[M]ost American communities pick their own teachers, village clerks, policemen, and other public servants, giving a preference to whatever local
talent is available. In an Indian community, however, such jobs . . . are
generally filled . . . by persons . . . who have no familiarity with local conditions, customs, ways, and people, and who often cannot even under239
stand the community’s language.

An employer of similar mind may elect to hire or promote a Native-American candidate on the reasoning that the Native-American
candidate has this knowledge, where the employment decision is
premised on the Indian status of the candidate and not any particularized evidence about the candidate’s interest in or experience with
tribal members. Accordingly, the Indian preference may, at least in
some circumstances, allow employers to make an employment decision on the categorical presumption that Native Americans possess
237

238

239

While the preference itself enables eligible employers to hire “any individual,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(i), in reality it has been invoked to hire members of federally enrolled tribes.
See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 154 F.3d
1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1998) (presenting an example of a preference given to member of
Navajo tribe for hiring purposes and deciding it did not fall within the statutory exception); Morton, 417 U.S. at 555 (upholding preference open to any qualified “Indian”).
Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal
Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 650 (2006); see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF
FEATHERS:
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 51 (1995)
(“[P]ractitioners and scholars of Indian law owe [a huge debt] to the late Felix Cohen.”).
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L.J. 348, 361 (1953). As an example, Freya Ray writes that the “Indian requirements” may “include factors such as cultural awareness and language skills.” Freya Ray,
Comment, Preserving Indian Preference for Native American Self-Governance, 36 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 223, 239 (2012).
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certain valued qualities. The employer will expects the candidate to
exhibit those presumed traits, for example, the familiarity and language skills mentioned by Cohen. The employer, at the same time,
presumes the absence of this familiarity and language skills in nonNative candidates. In giving effect to these presumptions, the employer denies equal consideration to the non-Native candidate. The
employer ties specific content to the status of the candidate, depriving the candidate of the ability to determine whether and how the
status matters.
Moreover, Native Americans are deprived of the opportunity to
understand that non-Natives may possess the desired familiarity and
language skills despite their different status. The presumptions effectively reserve employment positions for Native candidates. Finally,
the employer can use the courts as conduits for these presumptions,
by way of the courts simply recognizing that these practices are outside of the bounds of Title VII’s anti-discrimination standards. The
courts likely also cannot invoke the Equal Protection Clause as a way
to address these employment decisions, unless the employers are
240
state actors.
In sum, while Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are generally unavailable as the vehicles for mounting any challenge to this
241
practice, there are numerous costs that lie on a side of the ledger.
C. Affirmative Action
There may be interest in ascertaining whether a doctrine dealing
with race can be used as an instrument to challenge race-conscious
admissions policies. The simple answer is that racial mirroring cannot be employed to invalidate race-conscious admissions in higher
240

241

See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited [by the Fourteenth Amendment]. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”).
A thoughtful commentator asks whether the Indian preference should be accepted, not
as a means by which to effectuate a preference for individuals from federally enrolled
tribes, but as a “jobs program.” To this, I offer two responses. First, this neutral construction of the preference still leaves open the very real possibility that an employer may select a candidate because of a blanket bias and not because of the individualized characteristics of the candidates. Second, and relatedly, the costs of the preference would still
exist even if the preference has an economic or development justification. Indeed, tribal
sovereignty and tribal economic independence are, by themselves, worthy goals. The addition of a third objective—tribal employment—is also important, though does not eliminate the costs enumerated herein. Whether those goals offset the costs is beyond the
scope of this Article. This Article only identifies some costs of the preference without
making any comment on the merits of the purposes of the preference or their significance relative to the costs.
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education insofar as how such admissions policies are specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
242
In 1978, Justice Powell, writing the controlling opinion for the
243
Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, found only one
compelling state interest for taking race into account in higher education admissions: producing the educational benefits of a diverse
244
student body. Twenty-five years later, in 2003, the Court in Grutter
v. Bollinger reviewed the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions plan and in doing so reaffirmed that student body diversity in higher education is a compel245
The Court appreciated, for
ling reason to use racial classification.
example, that racial diversity in higher education facilitates crossracial understanding, breaks down racial stereotypes, and allows
graduates to be better prepared for a diverse workforce and for leadership positions in diverse employment contexts, including in the
246
military. The Court, paying special attention to the relationship between the First Amendment and institutions of higher education, asserted that it would defer to the law school’s view that diversity,
247
broadly defined, is essential to its educational mission.
The Grutter Court also deemed the law school’s admissions policy
to be narrowly tailored in furtherance of its compelling state interest.
The law school sought to admit a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minority groups, e.g., African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
248
A “critical mass,” according to the law school, is the
Americans.
point at which a student from an underrepresented minority group
does not feel isolated or that he or she feels compelled to express
249
views stereotypical of his or her racial group. Once a “critical mass”
is present, the law school argued, a student from an underrepresented minority group no longer feels isolated or compelled to be a
spokesperson for his or her race; the student instead is free to articulate individual viewpoints that may differ from the stereotypical view-

242

243
244
245
246
247
248
249

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (“Justice Powell’s opinion announcing
the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of raceconscious admissions policies.”).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 311–15 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
Id. at 330–32.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318–19.
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point associated with his or her race. 250 In that sense, the educational
benefits of diversity may be achieved because other students may
come to realize that students from the underrepresented minority
251
community do not hold stereotypical or monolithic ideas.
The “critical mass” theory nonetheless has problems. For example, it presumes that a student from an underrepresented minority
group possesses viewpoints that will enrich the student body or that
will break down stereotypes; expects the student from an underrepresented minority group to articulate those unique viewpoints in order
for the benefits of diversity to flourish; presumes that individuals
from other racial groups do not have viewpoints that will enrich student body diversity or that will break down stereotypes; denies equal
consideration in admissions to applicants from these racial groups;
drives the meaning of the applicants’ racial identity by presuming the
existence or non-existence of viewpoints on the basis of racial identity
alone; and utilizes courts as a means by which to validate the stereo252
types.
While the principles animating racial mirroring may apply to
some degree to race-conscious admissions, affirmative action is not
racial mirroring which occurs when the racial composition of one
group is adjusted so as to reflect the racial composition of a second
group. Affirmative action, as allowed by the Court in Bakke and
Grutter, is not an attempt by colleges and universities to match the racial composition of the student body to the racial composition of the
253
local or national community. Instead, such policies are permissible

250

251
252

253

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 747 (6th Cir. 2002)
(explaining how a critical mass aims to ensure that minority students “feel comfortable
discussing issues freely based on their personal experiences”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
It may not deprive students of the understanding that individuals from nonunderrepresented minority groups have unique and valuable viewpoints, as those students may be admitted by way of a race-neutral admissions policy. It also does not reserve
social roles for individuals of certain races. While admissions in higher education is a zero-sum game, a student at a certain school may not itself be a “social role,” though student at an elite university or in college as a whole may be.
To the extent that any race-conscious actions by schools are premised on attempts to reflect the racial makeup of the student body with the local or national population, such actions should be invalidated as impermissible racial mirroring. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 766–77 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that, even with “an interest in producing an educational environment
that reflects the pluralistic society in which our children will live,” to prefer “members of
any one group for no reason other than race” is unconstitutional); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional command to
desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole.”).
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to the extent they are designed to produce the educational benefits
254
of a diverse student body.
Accordingly, there are harms associated with race-conscious admissions, but this Article cannot be used as a way to undue affirmative
action.
IV. THE REMEDY
If racial mirroring takes race off the table when decisionmakers
try to obtain certain benefits by way of matching the racial composition of one group to that of the served constituency, the question becomes how decisionmakers can receive those same benefits without
resorting to race. Put differently, how can decisionmakers select
candidates who can generate trust and cooperation among clients in
a race-neutral fashion? How else can police departments be assured
that officers assigned to majority-minority neighborhoods will produce external affection, without directing that the officers reflect the
racial makeup of the residents?
A. The Rule
To fashion an acceptable tool with which these entities can further their interests while at the same time avoid the problems of racial mirroring, it is necessary to delve deeper into the problems
themselves. At its core, racial mirroring is harmful because entities
presume, on the basis of racial identity alone, the existence or nonexistence of certain traits. These are the first and third harms of
those identified in this Article. These other identified harms are byproducts of, and thus are secondary to these two, primary harms. It is
only because of the operation of the presumptions that individuals
are expected to perform, that they may be denied equal consideration, that an imposed meaning is given to the individuals’ racial identities, that social roles are deemed the proper domain of a specific
race, that prevents others from understanding that the presumptions
are inaccurate, and that courts are brought in to validate the presumptions. These harms only spring from the presumptions themselves.
Accordingly, any remedy must be directed towards the presumptions that an individual, because he or she has a certain racial identity, categorically has or does not have certain attributes or traits.
Decisionmakers interested in ensuring that individuals have certain
254

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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traits (e.g., an ability to generate trust and cooperation) for purposes
of realizing certain benefits from those traits (e.g., greater effectiveness in performing their functions) should assess whether there is any
particularized evidence from the individual’s record or materials that
the individual has or does not have the desired traits. As Terrence
Dodd, a black resident of Ferguson, said in response to questions
about the diversity of the Ferguson police officers, “It don’t make a
difference what color they are . . . . [I]t’s not about race or none of
that. We just need good police officers.” 255 More generally, Eugene
Volokh rightly states that “even when race is correlated with a relevant job characteristic . . . one should just look at that characteristic
256
and not use race as a proxy.”
This rule has several values. It disabuses entities of race-based
presumptions that are harmful themselves and that give rise to additional harms. It restores the individual as the determinant of whether
and to what extent his or her racial identity matters, and what meaning may attach to his or her racial identity. It affords greater respect
to the individual, as it does not treat the individual as a person with
predetermined or monolithic attitudes, attributes, or experiences. It
also pays more honest tribute to the constitutional command that individuals be treated as individuals, not as undifferentiated members
257
of a racial group.
This is not to pretend that race does not matter in our society.
Nor is it to suggest that we should close our eyes to racial realities.
But the harms of racial presumptions, when they occur, must be
identified and both academics and the courts may be counseled
against the promotion or adoption, respectively, of those presumptions.
B. Application
It may be helpful to explore how this rule would function in actuality. Instead of relying on racial presumptions, the decisionmaker,
such as an employer, would review the record (e.g., the applicant’s
résumé, letters of recommendation, other supporting materials, and
interview performance) to assess whether the applicant has the inter255

256
257

Art Holliday, Ferguson Police Department Diversity Questioned, KSDK, Aug. 18, 2014, available
at
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/08/12/ferguson-police-departmentdiversity-questioned-officers/13976879.
Volokh, supra note 105 at 2061.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“[A] university’s admissions program must remain flexible
enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that
makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.”).
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est, ability, and experience to produce trust and cooperation among
the served public. Put differently, the employer may examine whether—by reference to the applicant’s experience, abilities, and personality—the applicant has a demonstrated interest in the served community, has effective social skills, and is able to engender support and
trust.
The class counsel orders issued by Judge Baer and discussed in
Part I may exemplify how this rule is to apply. In the class counsel
context, the touchstone for an inquiry as to whether class counsel
may fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class is
whether the attorneys are competent and have any conflicts that
would impair the ability of any attorney to zealously advocate on be258
Indeed, an Advisory Committee Note to Federal
half of the class.
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)—a relatively new rule created in 2003
259
to govern the appointment of class counsel —“articulates the obligation of class counsel to represent the interests of the class, as opposed
260
to the potentially conflicting interests of individual class members.”
To appraise whether class counsel meet this standard, Rule
23(g)(1)(A) requires courts to examine the following factors: “the
work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims
in the action,” “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other
complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action,”
“counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law,” and “the resources that
261
counsel will commit to representing the class . . . .” Linda Mullenix
similarly notes that courts making class counsel adequacy determinations generally have demanded that counsel be “qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation,” considering specifically “class counsel’s competence,” “particular expertise,”

258

259

260
261

See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“[A]dequacy of representation is measured by two standards. First, class counsel must be
qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation. Second, the class
members must not have interests that are antagonistic to one another.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
852–53 (1999) (pointing out that counsel’s ability to best represent the interests of the
class were undermined by their “divergent interests” which were “patently at odds” with
those of the class).
See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although questions concerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . those questions have, since
2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) Advisory Committee’s Note.
Id. § 23(g)(1)(A).
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“counsel’s resources,” “possible conflicts of interest with the class[,]”
262
and any ethical conduct.
To be sure, Rule 23(g)(1)(B) contains a catchall provision that
enables a judge to weigh anything “pertinent” to class counsel’s abil263
ity to “fairly and adequately” represent the interests of the clients.
This is the precise provision that Judge Baer invoked in imposing a
264
racial diversity requirement on class counsel.
But rather than relying on presumptions premised on race as to
the adequacy or inadequacy of class counsel premised upon race,
judges should make individualized determinations as to whether
counsel possess these general indicia of competence and are without
conflicts that compromise their ability to fully represent their clients’
interests. As Professor Mullenix argues, “Courts should be required
to develop a factual, evidentiary record on the adequacy requirement
and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law based on those
265
The evidentiary record would be based on counsels’ “supfacts.”
porting evidence of competency, experience, resources, and con266
flicts” —not presumptions tied to race.
In sum, an individualized, appraisal as to whether a candidate has
the desired qualities allows the decisionmaker to realize the benefits
from those qualities without running into the numerous problems
267
with racial mirroring.

262

263
264
265
266
267

Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1698–99 (2004) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The author adds that many courts do not engage in
this searching inquiry, presuming instead the adequacy of counsel. See id. at 1699–1701.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) Advisory Committee’s Note.
See Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 1, 12 (2d Cir. 2012).
Mullenix, supra note 262 at 1734.
Id. at 1740.
The racial mirroring doctrine does not apply to race-conscious admissions as those admissions policies have been approved by the Court in Bakke and Grutter. That said, the
rule offered here, if implemented, would require college and university admissions offices to base determinations as to whether an applicant will contribute to the diversity of the
student body on an applicant’s file, such as the applicant’s personal statement, work history, letters of recommendation, or other similar aspects of the application. These materials would provide an individualized, evidentiary foundation for a conclusion that the
applicant has diverse viewpoints, experiences, or attitudes, and thus is worthy of a “plus.”
In other words, the file, not the racial self-identification of the applicant, would be the
touchstone for the student body diversity inquiry. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 338 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of an admissions system in which “[a]ll
applicants have the opportunity to highlight their own potential diversity contributions
through the submission of a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay
describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the
Law School”).
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CONCLUSION
268

Race is a social construct that, by itself, has no meaning. An undeniable aspect of American history is the assignment of particular
meanings to race: the divine dominance of whites, and the inferiority
of all others, especially African Americans and Native Americans. In
America’s history, race was more than a social construct, but a dividing line between the “superior” and the subjugated. The painful past
and its legacy should not be brushed aside, and shall remain an important lesson in the lasting flaws in the Framers’ otherwise lofty concepts of liberty and equality, the deficiencies of the Framers them269
selves, and what harm can come of categorical racial views and
practices.
Today, the vestiges of that improper thinking and behavior remain; racial discrimination, while less pervasive and more implicit by
nature, is not a relic of the past. Race continues to inform and affect
views of others, and it opens and closes doors of opportunity. More
than anything, race is not a social construct, but a powerful stimulant
in American society—one that tends to excite and break apart the
people. “[R]ace unfortunately still matters,” the Supreme Court has
270
stated.
The question becomes, how do we become closer to the point in
which racial differences are irrelevant to our abilities to perceive and
treat each other?
In narrow form, this Article identifies three spheres of constitutional and social harms that stem from the practice of racial mirroring, defined herein as altering the racial composition of one group to
reflect or match the racial composition of a second group. The specific conclusion that should be drawn from this Article is that the “ex-

268

269

270

See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 73 (1996)
(“Race is nothing more than what society and the law say it is.”); Ian F. Haney López, The
Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10–16, 46–53 (1994) (discussing how race is not a foregone natural or
biological determination, but rather a social phenomenon over which an individual has
some degree of choice); Managing an Identity Crisis: Forum Guide to Implementing New Federal Race and Ethnicity Categories, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (Oct. 2008), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/rediguide/exhibit4_1.asp (“Assigning a race and ethnicity
to an individual is a somewhat arbitrary exercise because these are not scientific or anthropological categories.”).
See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 28
(2012) (“The Framers’ revolutionary and generous concept of liberty did not extend to
‘blacks’ or ‘Negroes,’ who were in the United States as slave laborers. Instead, it expressly
permitted and perpetuated slavery.” (citations omitted)).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
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ternal legitimacy” doctrine is a form of racial mirroring and is thus
unsustainable on constitutional and social grounds.
The broader ambition of this Article is to help lay the groundwork
for a constitutional and social rule that forbids the use of all categorical racial presumptions. It endeavors to make the case that, because
of these harms, categorical racial preferences must cede to individualized evaluations. The Court has recognized that “[i]f our society is
to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize
that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress
271
This Article seeks to give
and causes continued hurt and injury.”
full meaning to this principle and to thereby accelerate the moment
when individuals will be treated as individuals.

271

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1991).

